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Commentators and jurists have long searched for an explanation
of the true value served by the first amendment's protection of free
speech. This issue certainly has considerable intellectual appeal,
and the practical stakes are also high. For the answer we give to the
question what value does free speech serve may well determine the
extent of constitutional protection to be given to such forms of
expression as literature, art, science, commercial speech, and speech
related to the political process.
There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court
has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free expression.1 These efforts have been characterized by "a pattern of
aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and frequent changes of position by individual Justices." 2 Commentators, by contrast, have
been eager to elaborate upon their unified theories of the value of
free speech. Professor Emerson, probably the leading modern
theorist of free speech, has recognized four separate values served
by the first amendment's protection of expression: (1) "assuring individual self-fulfillment;" 3 (2) "advancing knowledge and discovering truth;" 4 (3) "provid[ing] for participation in decisionmaking
by all members of society;" 1 and (4) "achieving a more adaptable
and hence a more stable community,... maintaining the precarious
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." ' Alf Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. A modified version of this article will
appear as part of the author's book Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis,
forthcoming from the Bobbs-Merrill Co.
The author thanks Ms. Karen Zulauf (Northwestern University School of Law
class of 1983) for her valuable research assistance.
I See, e.g., T. EmERsoN, TnE SYsTEM OF FREmnOm OF ExPPxsSION 15 (1970)
("The outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is that the Supreme Court
has never developed any comprehensive theory of what that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases."); see also Bloustein,
The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationshipsof the Political Values Served by Freedom, of Expression, 33 RUTGERs L. REv. 372 (1981).
2
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FOUND.
RESFmcH J. 521, 526.
a T. EMmsoN, supra note 1, at 6.
4Id.

5 Id. 7.
6(9d.
(591)
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though Emerson sees these as distinct values, he believes that "[e]ach
is necessary, but not in itself sufficient, for the four of them are
interdependent."7
Other scholars have culled from the values suggested by Emerson, concluding either that the first amendment is designed to foster
or protect only one of them, or that it protects a hierarchy of these
different values, with the constitutional protection given to various
forms of expression to be adjusted accordingly. Professor Meiklejohn, for example, spoke eloquently of the value of free speech to
the political process.8 In order to prevent the protection of such
speech from being reduced to a matter of "proximity and degree," 1
he urged exclusion from the first amendment guarantee of all speech
that did not relate to this self-government value."'
Although Meiklejohn in later years appeared to soften the
rigidity of his lines of demarcation by effectively extending his
doctrine-in a somewhat less than persuasive manner-to many forms
of apparently nonpolitical speech," other commentators have
adopted his initial premise and kept within its logical limits. Judge
Bork, now the leading exponent of the government-process school
of thought, has concluded that the sole purpose served by the constitutional guarantee is to aid the political process, and that absolutely no other form of expression can logically be considered to
fall within it.12 Professor Blasi, although not rejecting all other
asserted values of free expression, has urged recognition of what he
labels the "checking value" as the primary purpose of the first
amendment. 13 Under this analysis, speech relating to official misconduct would receive the greatest degree of constitutional protection.14 Other commentators have selected various forms of an
"individual development" model as the touchstone of first amend7

Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68

CArW.

L.

REv.

422, 423 (1980).
8 See A. Mm.KLEJoHN, POLrricAL FRs o
Meiklejolb's Free Speech (1948)).

(1960)

(expanded

version of

9 id.55.
10 See infranotes 28-32 and accompanying text.

"1 Meildejobn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245;
see infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
12 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971); see also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978).
13

Blasi, supranote 2.

14

See infra notes 69-74 & 76 and accompanying text.
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ment protection,15 and have structured their constitutional interpretation accordingly. Finally, some scholars, of course, are committed to the "marketplace-of-ideas" approach (long associated with
the famous dissent of Justice Holmes in A brains v. United States 16),
which posits that the primary function of free speech is as a catalyst
17
to the discovery of truth.
Although many respected scholars have appraised this myriad
of free speech theories, it is time for a major reassessment of the
subject, for each of these theories is, I believe, flawed in result, or
structure, or both. Many first amendment theorists have failed to
return to first principles in determining the value served by free
speech, whereas others who may well be approaching an analysis of
true first principles have neglected to examine the logical implications flowing therefrom. The result in virtually all cases is an
unduly narrow description of the category of communication that is
deserving of full constitutional protection.
The position taken in this Article is that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, which
I have labeled "individual self-realization." This term has been
chosen largely because of its ambiguity: it can be interpreted to
refer either to development of the individual's powers and abilities
-an individual "realizes" his or her full potential-or to the individual's control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions-an individual "realizes" the goals in life that he or she
has set. In using the term, I intend to include both interpretations.
I have, therefore, chosen it instead of such other options as "liberty"
or "autonomy," on the one hand, and "individual self-fulfillment"
or "human development," on the other. The former pair of alternatives arguably may be limited to the decisionmaking value,1 8
16 Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 964 (1978) ("liberty"); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
PmL. & Pun. Aff. 204 (1972) ("autonomy").

16250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, I., dissenting).
17 See

infra text accompanying notes 88-90.

is One authority interprets "autonomy" to mean:
making one's own choices. A person is not autonomous whose choices are
dictated 'from outside' at gunpoint or, perhaps, through hypnosis ...
On the other hand, full deliberative rationality is not required for autonomy.
Spontaneous or ill-considered decisions can be just as much my decisions,
and that is the touchstone as I understand autonomy.
L. Cnocnxn, Posriw LmxwTy 114 (1980).

Professor Baker also adopts the term "liberty" to describe his operative model
of free speech, yet appears to be referring to the concept of individual self-fulfillment. See Baker, supra note 15, at 990-96.
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whereas the latter could be interpreted reasonably as confined to
the individual development concept.
That the first amendment serves only one ultimate value, however, does not mean that the majority of values thought by others
to be fostered by free speech-the "political process," "checking,"
and "marketplace-of-ideas" values-are invalid. I have not chosen
from a list of mutually exclusive possibilities, nor do I argue that
the value that I have selected supersedes these alternatives. My
contention is that these other values, though perfectly legitimate,
are in reality subvalues of self-realization. To the extent that they
are legitimate, each can be explained by-and only by-reference to
the primary value: individual self-realization. It thus is inaccurate
to suggest that "the commitment to free expression embodie[s] a
complex of values." 19
This Article attempts to establish that this first principle-individual self-realization-can be proven, not merely by reference to
some unsupportable, conclusory assertions of moral value,20 but by
reasoning from what we in this nation take as given: our democratic
system of government. 21 It demonstrates that the moral norms inherent in the choice of our specific form of democracy logically
imply the broader value, self-realization. It then concludes that all
forms of expression that further the self-realization value,2 which
justifies the democratic system as well as free speech's role in it, are
deserving of full constitutional protection.
An analysis of the self-realization value must avoid giving it an
unduly restrictive interpretation. 23 Any external determination
that certain expression fosters self-realization more than any other
is itself a violation of the individual's free will, recognition of which
19 Blasi, supra note 2, at 538.
20 Professor Baker, for example, attempts to establish the correctness of his "liberty" model by reasoning in the following manner: "Obligation exists only in relationships of respect. To justify legal obligation, the community must respect
individuals as equal, rational and autonomous moral beings. For the community
legitimately to expect individuals to respect collective decisions, i.e., legal rules, the
community must respect the dignity and equal worth of its members." Baker, supra
note 15, at 991. Although I personally might accept Professor Baker's moral assertion, I-and, I expect, Professor Baker-would have a difficult time responding to
someone who denied that an individual's obligation to obey the law has anything to
do with government's respect for the individual, other than to say, "Oh, yes it
does."
21 See infra text following note 48.
22 For an analysis of exactly how expression may be thought to foster the self-

realization value, see infra text following note 51.
23 Professor Baker's analysis is flawed in this respect.
and accompanying text.

See infra notes 101-06
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is inherent in the self-realization principle. This Article therefore
argues that the Supreme Court should not determine the level of
constitutional protection by comparing the relative values of different types of speech,2 4 as is the current practice. 25
This Article then proceeds to discuss briefly the appropriate
role of "balancing" in first amendment analysis. Although recognition of the self-realization value leads to the view that all forms
of expression are equally valuable for constitutional purposes, this
does not necessarily imply that all forms of expression must receive
absolute, or even equal, protection in all cases. Protestations of a
number of commentators to the contrary notwithstanding,2 there
is no inconsistency in recognizing that individual self-realization is
the sole value furthered by free speech and simultaneously acknowledging that, at least in extreme cases, full constitutional protection
of free expression may be forced to give way to competing social
concerns.
In summary, then, this Article rejects those authorities (1) who
believe that the first amendment is multivalued, whether they superimpose a hierarchy upon those values or recognize them as interdependent coequals; (2) who argue that the first amendment is
single-valued, with that value being something other than individual
self-realization; (3) who, although accepting the self-realization value
or its rough equivalent as the sole determinant of free speech, refuse
to acknowledge one or more of the various subvalues that derive
from it; and (4) who believe that total reliance on something akin
to the self-realization value is inconsistent with any form of constitutional balancing process with regard to free speech.
After detailing the sources and parameters of the self-realization
value27 and demonstrating how each legitimate subvalue is explain24

See infra notes 119-202 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
26
See infra note 114.
27
A word should be said at this point about the nature of my reasoning process.
My argument is essentially a logical one, reasoning from what I take to be widely
held premises. I make only brief and tangential reference to the history of the first
amendment and the intent of the amendment's framers. See infra note 54. My
theory therefore may be attacked by those who believe that historical analysis is
the only appropriate method of constitutional interpretation.
Few, if any, of the commentators analyzing the value of free speech, however,
place significant reliance on the intent of the framers. This is primarily because, as
Judge Bork states, "[t]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech
and appear not to have been overly concerned with the subject." Bork, supra
note 12, at 22. To the extent that any consensus did exist, it appears to have been
on an extremely narrow and technical conception of free expression. See generally
L. L=vY, LEGACY OF SuPPBESsioN (1960). It is therefore not surprising that
historical reference has been of limited value in first amendment analysis.
25
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able only as a manifestation of that principle, this Article considers
how acceptance of these theoretical precepts would affect the level
and form of constitutional protection given to three categories of
expression: commercial speech, defamation, and obscenity.
I.

SELF-REALIZATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS:

ASCERTAINING THE ULTIMATE VALUE OF FREE SPEECH

A. The "Democratic Process" Value
An appropriate way to begin analysis of the self-realization
value is, ironically, with a discussion of the theory of free speech
perhaps farthest in practical result from that value: the view that
the sole purpose of the free speech guarantee is to facilitate operation of the democratic process. Advocates of this position are
logically required to establish two propositions: first, that the first
amendment facilitates the political process, and second, that the
first amendment does not foster any value other than conduct of
the political process. Examination of the writings of those expounding this view reveals that they have established the former with
considerably greater force than they have established the latter.
AS already noted, the original exponent of such a theory was
Professor Meiklejohn. He began with the premise that "[g]overnments ... derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.
8
If that consent be lacking, governments have no just powers." 2

Because government officials in a democracy are merely agents of
the electorate, the electorate needs as much information as possible
to aid it in performing its governing function in the voting booth. 29

Therefore, "[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs from
the necessities of the program of self-government. .

.

. It is a de-

duction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall
be decided by universal suffrage." 30
Few would argue with Meiklejohn's logic to this point. If the
electoral decisions made by the voters are to be based on anything
more than emotive hunches, they need a free flow of information
that will inform them not only about the candidates but also about
the day-to-day issues of government. 31 But what seemed counter28 A. MxLEJom-N, supra note 8, at 9.
29 Meildejohn, supra note 11, at 255.

30 A. Ma=rxjoHN, supra note 8, at 27.
31Cf. B. BmmLSON, P. LAzARsRELD & W. McPHmE,

VorING 307 (1954)

("If

there is one characteristic for a democratic system (besides the ballot itself) that is
theoretically required, it is the capacity for and the practice of discussion.").
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intuitive to some was the apparent implication of Meiklejohn's
theory that such "nonpolitical" forms of speech as art, literature,
science, and education were not protected by the first amendment.Meiklejohn himself ultimately concluded "that the people do need
novels and dramas and paintings and poems, 'because they will be
called upon to vote.' "33 He thus included within the category of
"political" speech numerous forms of expression that do not appear to
have any direct-or arguably even indirect-impact upon the political
process. He would presumably give full first amendment protection
to both the author and the reader who profess absolutely no interest
in the political system, and who have never voted and never will,
but who simply enjoy writing or reading good fiction. For this
extension of his theory, Meiklejohn has been attacked both by those
who believe that the first amendment has no special political basis 34
and by political "purists" who accept Meiklejohn's initial premise
about the relationship between the first amendment and the political
process, but question the logic of his extension.3 5
Judge Bork begins his analysis with this same premise about
the political process, but rigidly limits his conclusions to such speech,
thus escaping the attack levelled at Professor Meiklejohn. Judge
Bork, however, has great difficulty explaining why the first amendment should be read to protect only political expression.
Judge Bork's first amendment analysis flows from his concern
that constitutional interpretation be premised on "neutral principles." 31 The decisions of the Supreme Court "must be controlled
by principle," a7which may be defined as "'reasons with respect to
all the issues in a case, reasons that in their generality and their
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.' "38
32

See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
1, 15-16; Chafee, Book Review, 62 IAv. L. REv. 891, 896 (1949).

REv.

33

Meiklejohn, supra note 11, at 263.
include myself within this category. See Redish, The First Amendment in
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. 1Ev. 429, 437-38 (1971).
35According to Professor BeVier, "[tihe essential problem with accepting
341

Meiklejohn's analogies is that one cannot know in principle which forms of thought
and expression contribute to 'the capacity for sure and objective judgment."'
BeVier, supra note 12, at 317.

86Bork, supra note 12, at 1-20. In so doing, he draws upon the famous work
of Professor Wechsler. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv.L. REv. 1 (1959).
37 Bork, supra note 12, at 2 (footnote omitted).
38 Id. (quoting, with a minor error, Wechsler, supra note 36, at 19).
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Judge Bork concludes that only speech serving the political process
can be deemed "principled." 39
The method by which Judge Bork reaches this conclusion may
be described as a lesson in the limits of the "neutral principles"
concept. It demonstrates all too clearly that if the selection of
premises is flawed, "neutral principles" will not prevent a doctrine
from being applied in a similarly flawed-albeit "principled" and
consistent-manner. Judge Bork begins his analysis by quoting the
well-known concurrence of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California.4° Brandeis identified what Bork has distilled into four
benefits provided by the free speech guarantee: "[t]he development
of the faculties of the individual; [t]he happiness to be derived from
engaging in the activity; [t]he provision of a safety value [sic] for
society; and [t]he discovery and spread of political truth." 1 Bork
then proceeds to explain why the first three values cannot be considered values of the first amendment under a "principled" analysis.
Since Justice Brandeis's first category is the closest to the concept of individual self-realization urged here, it is most relevant to
determine why Judge Bork concludes that this value cannot be
thought to lie behind the constitutional guarantee. Although Bork
42
does not deny that free speech may develop individual faculties,
he nevertheless believes that the development of an individual's
faculties and the happiness derived from engaging in speech
do not distinguish speech from any other human activity.
An individual may develop his faculties ... from trading

on the stock market, following his profession as a river-port
pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity,
playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of
other endeavors. .

.

. These functions or benefits of

speech are, therefore, to the principled judge, indistinguishable from the functions or benefits of all other human
43

activity.

Judge Bork ultimately concludes that Justice Brandeis's fourth
category-the search for "political truth"-is the only legitimate
ground of the first amendment. This conclusion in turn leads him
to adopt a first amendment construction that is quite probably the
39 Bork, supra note 12, at 26.
40274

U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

41 Bork, supra note 12, at 25.
42 Id.

43 Id.

A similar argument is fashioned by Professor BeVier.

note 12, at 313-14.

BeVier, supra
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most narrowly confined protection of speech ever supported by a
modem jurist or academic: "Constitutional protection should be
.accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no
basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call
obscene or pornographic." 4
Judge Bork's rationale for including political speech and excluding nonpolitical forms of expression, even if they further the
value of self-fulfillment, is that it is logically possible to limit the
value served by political speech to "speech." Self-fulfillment, on
the other hand, cannot logically be limited to "speech," but must
also be taken to include countless forms of action. Judge Bork's
conclusion that political speech should be protected is, however,
inconsistent with his belief that any acceptable rationale for free
speech must be logically unique to speech. For there are countless
actions-such as a bombing by the FALN to protest oppression of
Puerto Rico, an assasination of a foreign political leader because of
human rights violations in his country, and the breaking of windows
at the Iranian Consulate to protest the treatment of Americans in
Iran-that can be thought to convey very significant political messages. Those who undertake such activities could argue with a fair
degree of persuasiveness that the public attention attracted to such
acts is geometrically greater than that which would be received by
public statements or pickets. Even if we rejected this argument,
however, the issue for Judge Bork is not whether the value in question can be furthered by speech, as well as by conduct, but whether
it can only be furthered by speech. Bork otherwise could not exclude nonpolitical speech that aids individual self-fulfillment on
the ground that conduct may also aid such a goal. It is, therefore,
difficult to understand how he can protect political speech, when
countless forms of political action could achieve similar results. 45
44

Bork, supra note 12, at 20. "Moreover, within that category of speech we
ordinarily call political, there should be no constitutional obstruction to laws making
criminal any speech that advocates forcible overthrow of the government or the
violation of any law." Id.
45 One might argue that these actions standing alone do not effectively convey
any message. Rather, there also must be some oral or written communication by
the perpetrators of the act describing their motivation. Assuming this to be true,
the point in no way undermines the conclusion that the act is an essential aspect
of the attempt to convey political truth, since the statement of motivation would
make little sense without performance of the act.
Professor BeVier, arguing in support of Judge Bork's position, reasons that
"beliefs and opinions are often most effectively communicated by forms of conduct
other than verbal expression." BeVier, supra note 12, at 319 (footnote omitted).
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Political actions, unlike some of the faculty-developing activities
referred to by Judge Bork, have as an essential part of their purpose
a communicative aspect. But it is unlikely that Bork would be satisfied with a distinction based on communicative purpose, since he
leaves little doubt that he would not choose to protect such actions.
In any event, there are numerous noncommunicative, nonspeech
activities that may be thought to aid in the attainment of political
truth. For example, working as a farmer could help one understand
the problems and benefits of farm price supports; working as a
doctor could do the same with respect to socialized medicine; living
in a large urban area and taking public transportation might convince one of the need for greater federal aid to cities and mass
transit. Thus, nonspeech activities could aid attainment of knowledge of political truth as much as does any political discourse.
Bork's logic therefore must be rejected, because it inescapably results in the content of speech protected by the first amendment
being a null set: there is no category of expression that furthers a
value or values unique to speech.
If one were to look for an appropriate basis for limiting the
protection of the first amendment to "speech," the natural starting
place would seem to be the language of the amendment itself, which
says nothing about protecting only political speech. 46 What the
language does refer to is "speech," and not action. Thus, we need
not find a logical distinction between the value served by speech
and the value served by conduct in order to justify protecting only
speech, for the framers have already drawn the distinction. Whether
or not the constitutional language must be read to provide absolute
protection to speech 4 7 there can be little doubt that it was intended
to provide greater protection to speech than to conduct, which is
relegated to the fifth amendment's protection against deprivation of
"liberty" without "due process of law." Indeed, that the framers
deemed it necessary to create a first amendment at all, rather than
merely including speech within the other forms of liberty protected
by the fifth amendment, indicates that speech is to receive a constitutional status above and beyond that given to conduct.
My point is, simply, that the exact same thing can be said about political speech, the

only category of expression that Judge Bork and Professor BeVier believe deserves
constitutional protection.
4
8 One would think that any attempt to develop a "principled" interpretation of

a constitutional provision would not begin by inserting limitations that are not
even hinted at in the constitutional language, and that indeed appear to depart from
a natural reading of the words.
of speech, and of the press."
47

The first amendment refers simply to "the freedom

This issue has been the subject of endless debate.

See infra notes 112-16.
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It is not hard to understand why constitutional protection of
speech would be greater than that of conduct. If we were to draw
a rough distinction-the kind that must necessarily have been drawn
by the framers-we could reasonably decide that speech is less likely
to cause direct or immediate harm to the interests of others 48 and
more likely to develop the individual's mental faculties, and that
speech thus deserves a greater degree of constitutional protection
than does conduct. Bork's assumption that any principled first
amendment theory must rely solely on values that are uniquely
protected by speech drastically undercuts this status by effectively
removing all categories of speech from the amendment's protection.
B. Deriving the Ultimate Value
The primary flaw in the analysis of Bork and Meiklejohn is
that they never attempt to ascertain what basic value or values the
democratic process was designed to serve. Examination of the
"process" values inherent in our nation's adoption of a democratic
system reveals an implicit belief in the worth of the individual that
has first amendment implications extending well beyond the borders
of the political world. Indeed, political democracy is merely a
means to-or, in another sense, a logical outgrowth of-the much
broader value of individual self-realization. The mistake of Bork
and Meiklejohn, then, is that they have confused one means of
obtaining the ultimate value with the value itself.
The logic employed by Meiklejohn and Bork to reach their
conclusion that the protection of speech. was designed to aid the
political process would have absolutely no relevance except in a
democratic system. For a monarchy or dictatorship to function
politically, it of course is not necessary that the general public be
able to speak freely or receive information about pressing political
48

Dean Wellington has correctly noted that "speech often hurts. It can offend,
injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and ignite the world. Moreover, a great
deal of other conduct that the state regulates has less harmful potential." Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L. 1105, 1106-07 (1979) (footnote
omitted). He cites, as one example of the latter, laws prohibiting certain forms of
sexual relations between consinting adults. Id. 1107. But (as noted in the text),
in establishing a constitutional rule that is to provide a guide for future generations,
it is impossible to enumerate the specific instances that deserve a greater degree of
protection and those that deserve a lesser degree. It is almost certainly true in the
overwhelming majority of cases that speech is less immediately dangerous than
conduct. In any event, I would argue, with respect to the example of laws regulating consensual sexual practices cited by Dean Wellington, that such conduct
should (at least as a matter of logic and morals) be deemed fully protected by the
self-realization principle. To the extent that it is not protected, it is probably
because there is no constitutional provision giving it the high level of protection
given speech by the first amendment.
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questions, because private individuals will have no say in decisions.
Even a benevolent dictator would be more likely to allow free expression in traditionally nonpolitical areas such as art, literature,
and music than in the political realm. The free speech value emphasized by Meiklejohn and Bork, then, is inherently linked to a
democratic form of government.
Democracy is by no means the only system that could have been
chosen when our nation was founded. Indeed, it is probably safe
to say that the overwhelming majority of organized societies
throughout history have not chosen it, even in its most diluted form.
It would seem, then, that there must be some values that the founding fathers believed to be uniquely fostered by a democracy, values
that succeeding generations of political leaders presumably have
shared, since there has been little or no effort to alter substantially
our system of government by constitutional processes.
One conceivable value is "consequentialist" in nature: efficiency. One could believe that the results of a democratic system
are somehow better than any other system's. Such an argument,
however, would be very difficult to prove, for several reasons. Initially, it would probably be difficult to obtain agreement on the
criteria for measuring results. How are we to decide what is
"better"? Higher gross national product? More international influence? And better for whom? Elites? A majority? Oppressed
minorities? Secondly, it is doubtful that we could establish empirically that throughout history democracies have fared better than
other forms of government. After all, we do know that the trains
ran on time in Mussolini's Italy; can the Chicago Transit Authority
make the same claim? Moreover, it may well be counter-intuitive
to believe, especially in a modern, highly technological society, that
decisions made by the masses or their elected representatives-who
are rarely chosen because of any degree of real expertise-would be
either the wisest or the most efficient. Finally, it is doubtful that
many of us would be anxious to discard democracy even if it were
established definitely that an alternative political system was more
efficient. It is likely, then, that the values inherent in a democratic
system are "process-oriented," rather than related to some objective
standard of governmental efficiency.
These "process" values seem to translate into two forms: an
"intrinsic" value and an "instrumental" value. The "intrinsic"
value is one that is achieved by the very existence of a democratic
system. It is the value of having individuals control their own
destinies. For if one does not accept the morality of such a propo-
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sition, why bother to select a democratic system in the first place?
As Meiklejohn said, "[filf men are to be governed, we say, then that
governing must be done, not by others, but by themselves. So far,
therefore, as our own affairs are concerned, we refuse to submit to
alien control." 49 The point is so obvious that it requires no further
elaboration, except to say that the core concept of "self-rule" appears to have formed the cornerstone of every theory of democracy
to date. 50 It would seem to be so as a matter of definition.
The second value of a democratic system is labeled "instrumental," because it is a goal to which a democratic system is designed to lead, rather than one that is attained definitionally by the
adoption of a democratic system. It is a goal that is associated primarily with "classical" (fully participatory) democracy: development
of the individual's human faculties. In the words of a leading
authority:
The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis
on individual participation in the development of public
policy... . Although the classical theorists accepted the
basic framework of Lockean democracy, with its emphasis
on limited government, they were not primarily concerned
with the policies which might be produced in a democracy;
above all else they were concerned with human development, the opportunities which existed in political activity
to realize the untapped potentials of men ....51
My thesis is that: (1) although the democratic process is a means
of achieving both the intrinsic and instrumental values, it is only
52
one means of doing so; (2) both values (which, as noted previously,
may be grouped under the broader heading of "self-realization")
supra note 8, at 9.
In the words of Professor Bachrach, "[dlemocratic participation

49 A. M ELEjonN,
50

. . .

is a

process in which persons formulate, discuss, and decide public issues that are

important to them and directly affect their lives." Bachrach, Interest, Participation,
and Democratic Theory, in PARTICIPATION IN PoLrrscs: NoMos XVI 39, 41 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975).
5
GWalker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 Am. POL. Sci.
REv. 285, 288 (1966) (emphasis in original); see also C. MACPHERSON, THm LIE
L DFmocRAcY 51 (1977) ("[Dlemocracy drew the people
A
Tn.ms oF LmuL.
into the operations of government by giving them all a practical interest, an interest
which could bring down a government Democracy would thus make people more
active, more energetic; it would advance them 'in intellect, in virtue, and in practical
activity and efficiency'."). John Stuart Mill is often associated with this "developmental" value of democracy. See Walker, supra, at 285; see also J.MIL, ON LIERTr

(1947)

(1st ed. London 1859).

52 See supra text preceding note 18.
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may be achieved by and for individuals in countless nonpolitical,
and often wholly private, activities; and (3) the concept of free
speech facilitates the development of these values by directly fostering the instrumental value and indirectly fostering the intrinsic
value. Free speech fosters the former goal directly in that the very
exercise of one's freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate, or learn
represents a use, and therefore a development, of an individual's
uniquely human faculties. It fosters the latter value indirectly because the very exercise of one's right of free speech does not in itself
constitute an exercise of one's ability to make life-affecting decisions
as much as it facilitates the making of such decisions.
This conceptual framework indicates that the appropriate scope
of the first amendment protection is much broader than Bork or
Meiklejohn would have it. Free speech aids all life-affecting decisionmaking, no matter how personally limited, in much the same
manner in which it aids the political process. Just as individuals
need an open flow of information and opinion to aid them in making their electoral and governmental decisions, they similarly need
a free flow of information and opinion to guide them in making
other life-affecting decisions. There thus is no logical basis for distinguishing the role speech plays in the political process. Although
we definitely need protection of speech to aid us in making political
judgments, we need it no less whenever free speech will aid development of the broader values than the democratic system is designed
to foster.
Before this thesis can be accepted, however, each of its two
prongs must confront significant counterarguments:
(1) The moral value of "self-rule" intrinsic in the
adoption of a democratic system is not transferable to the
private sphere, because that we value society's collective
ability to control its destiny does not necessarily imply that
we place an equal value upon individuals' power to direct
their personal lives. Individual and collective self-determination are very different conceptually, and indeed are
often in conflict.
(2) Although classical theorists of democracy may have
believed that human development would result from mass
political participation, modem theorists-the "elitists" or
"revisionists"-have totally undermined the basis for this
belief. Furthermore, that such human development could
be gained from participation in the political process would
not imply that similar benefits would derive from indi-
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Viduals' control over their private lives, because an essential premise of the classical theorists' belief was that this
benefit stemmed from individuals extending themselves
beyond narrow self-interest to concern about the common
good.
Although each of these arguments deserves a detailed response, it is
my contention that neither invalidates my thesis.
1. Collective Self-Rule and Individual Autonomy
One can argue that there is a conceptual difference between
the value of collective self-rule and that of individual self-rule.
In a democracy, numerous conflicts may develop between the majority's will and the desires of the individual. A "tyranny of the
majority," under which there is little or no room for the exercise
of individual autonomy, is readily imaginable.5 3 But my purpose
in this discussion is not to establish that the concept of collective
self-rule necessarily implies an impenetrable sphere of individual
autonomy (although the form of democracy established in this
nation, both historically and morally, does include the existence of
such a sphere).54 My point, rather, concerns the level of constitu5
3 See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51 (J. Madison); 1 A. DE ToCQUEvH.LE, DEMOCRACY rN AImmcA 241-54 (1966) (1st ed. Bruxelles 1835); J. MimL,
supra note 51, at 1-14.
5

4 The ideological father of the American Revolution is generally thought to be
John Locke. See L. LEvy, supra note 27, at 100; J. RocnE, COURTS AND RIGs
9-10 (1961); see also G. Woop, THE CRxATION OF THE AwMCAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 14, 283-84 (1969). Locke is widely thought of as a libertarian who
assumed... that there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal
freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is overstepped,
the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that
minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it
possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men
hold good or right or sacred.
I. Bmunq, Four EssAYs oN LmamTY 124 (1977); see also G. PAnRY, JoHm LoCKE
158-60 (1978).
It may well be, as Professor Roche suggests, that only "[a] careless reading
of Locke's Second Treatise suggests that be was a militant defender of the rights
of the citizen against government in general." J. RocHE, supra, at 9; see also L.
LEVY, supra note 27, at 103-04. However, Locke was undoubtedly a libertarian
relative to his contemporaries, see id. 100-01, and, as Roche acknowledges, the image
(perhaps mythical) of Locke as a strong believer in individual rights "had an enormous impact, particularly in the American Colonies." J. RocHE, supra, at 9. See
also G. WooD, supra, at 283-84. In any event, there can be little question that the
form of democracy that we have adopted imposes constitutional enclaves to protect
the individual's autonomy from majoritarian interference.
For an alternative interpretation of the ideological origins of the American
Revolution-one that de-emphasizes the role of Locke and substantiates the influence
of the moral-sense philosophy of the Enlightenment-see G. WmLs, INvn-Ncra
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tional protection to be given to speech that is related to whatever
decisionmaking the collective society does allow the individual to
make. I intend to show only that the logic employed by Meiklejohn and Bork to justify first amendment protection for speech
relevant- to political decisionmaking dictates a similar level of protection for speech related to whatever decisions actually are allowed
to the individual.
Let us imagine a hypothetical democratic society premised
solely on the utilitarian belief in the greatest good for the greatest
number, and with no moral or political regard for the individual
as such, except assurances that every individual will have a say (a
vote) in decisionmaking. Assume further that in this society every
decision affecting individuals-including decisions about dinner
menus, hair styles, entertainment activities, and bedtimes-is made
by a collective vote. Although in concept such a society is democratic, it of course removes from the individual more choices than
does virtually any authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, the inherent
value on which the system is premised is (collective) self-rule.
Under Meiklejohnian logic, debate and information about
every one of these decisions, no matter how trivial, would presumably have to receive full constitutional protection, because the
individuals that make up this society are in fact their own "governors," and therefore need open communication to aid them in
their "political" decisionmaking. This logic applies to speech of
the minority as well as the majority, because we presumably cannot
determine before the actual vote who will be in each group. Therefore, every voter must have the right to hear and learn every factor
that might influence the final vote.
Now assume a slight alteration in the arrangement of this
society: instead of collectively voting on every conceivable lifeaffecting decision, the members of the society vote periodically for
specific governors, who make each life-affecting decision for the
entire society. Under Meiklejohnian logic, here, too, we need full
protection of information for the society's members about each of
the issues that the governors will decide, because the underlying
moral precept of the society is still self-rule. The individuals
therefore need to know how the competing candidates for office will
decide these issues-for example, whether they will order chicken
or steak for dinner-so that they can choose the governors whose
Am~aUCA (1978). Wills' interpretation provides a historical and intellectual background that is consistent with the theory of individual self-realization advanced in
this Article.
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views coincide most closely with the individuals' personal preferences. Moreover, if the price of steak should rise during the governors' term of office, under Meiklejohnian logic the society's members would need the constitutional right to tell each other about
it, so that they might better judge the dinner choices made by
their governing agents. Simply put, Meiklejohn and Bork would
protect all speech related to the political process, but the term
"political" does not include a set category of specific substantive
issues. Rather, it applies to whatever issues a society decides collectively, whether by direct popular vote or through elected agentsNow assume that, whether because of moral concern about individual autonomy or simply because it does not wish to be bothered
with so many decisions, the collective society cedes to each individual full decisionmaking power, much as our own democratic
society does, on such questions as what to eat for dinner, what commerical products to buy, whom and whether to marry, what career
to choose, and where and whether to go to college-decisions that
previously were made by the collective or its agents and that therefore were "political." At this point, the individual has more than
an indirect say in how these decisions are to be made; he now has
full authority to make them, as well as commensurate responsibility
for their consequences.
Once these decisions have been removed from collective authority and completely given over to individual will, presumably
Meiklejohni and Bork would say that the individual no longer has
a constitutional right to information that will help him make them,
because they are no longer part of the political process. Their
logic, however, leaves us with an untenable situation: when an individual only has an indirect say in governing his life, either by
voting on particular questions or by selecting governing agents who
will make the decisions, he has a right to information that will
enable him to exercise his power more effectively; but when the
individual has full and total authority to make the very same decisions, his right to the information mysteriously vanishes. Reason
would seem to dictate, however, that the individual has at least as
great a need for a free flow of information and opinion related to
life-affecting decisions that he makes solely for himself. For
whether the decisions are made collectively or by the individual,
in a democracy we assume the moral value of self-rule. Thus, the
first amendment guarantee of free expression is designed to play
an important role in the exercise of that decisionmaking power at
either level.
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2. The Impact of the Elitist Theorists and the
Definition of "Political"
A critique based on the findings and conclusions of the socalled "elitist" 55 or "revisionist" 06 democratic theorists-who have
come into prominence mostly within the last forty years 5 7-is aimed
at the "instrumental" value of a democratic system: the development of individual abilities and faculties thought by classical theorists to flow from participation in the political process.5 8 The
argument, put simply, is that it is today unrealistic to expect the
common masses to gain such benefits, because it is unrealistic to
expect them to have both the interests and the ability to involve
themselves on a significant scale in day-to-day political affairs. The
pulls of work and family, Professor Lipset tells us, are too great to
expect the individual to bother with the complexities of political
affairs, especially when he sees the impact of those matters on his
life as remote. 9 Professor Dahl writes that "neither by instincts
nor by learning is [man] necessarily a political animal." 6o
Well-known empirical studies describing the average American voter's shocking lack of knowledge underscore this judgment. 61
55See, e.g., P. BACHACH, THE TnEoRY or DzmocRATs c ElnsM: A CRITIQuE
(1967); Walker, supra note 51.
56
Although the term "elitist" was apparently coined by one of the theory's
proponents, see Lipset, Introduction to R. MicmEr.Ls, PoamrcAL PARTMs 33 (1962),
at least one of the theorists who is often thought to fall into this grouping rejects
the term, because it is inaccurate and "even more so because in our language and
in our society it is unavoidably ... a pejorative, even a polemical epithet." Dahl,
Further Reflections on "The Elitist Theory of Democracy," 60 Am. POL. Scr. REv.
296i.297 n.7 (1966). The term "revisionism" is applied to this type of democratic
theory in Keim, Participationin Contemporary Democratic Theories, in PARTIcnpATION Ln PoLmIcs: Nomos XVI 1 (J. Pennock & R. Chapman eds. 1975).
57 The origin of the theory of democratic elitism is contained in the later chapters of G. MoscA, THE RuLING CLASS (1939). See P. BAcHAcH, supra note 55,
at 10.
58 See supra text preceding note 51.
59

Lipset, supra note 56, at 17; see also P. BACHRACH, supra note 55.
60R. DABL, MoDERN PomcAL AALysIs 55-56 (1963).
61

See, e.g., B. BEREIsoN, P. LAzARsFELo & W. McPIEE, VorIN
(1954);
A. CA-MB-I-, P. CoNvERsE, W. MrLa & D. SToEs, THE AMEUcAN VoTa
(1960). But see N. NiE, S. VERBA & J. Pzmocn, Tirm CHANGING AxA
,acA VoRm
123-73, 319-44 (1979). This more recent analysis suggests that the indicia of voter
awareness, issue consistency, and issue voting have demonstrated a marked increase
in voter awareness between 1956 (the terminal year of the Campbell, Converse,
Miller, and Stokes study) and 1976. However, Nie, Verba, and Petrocik add this
cautionary note to their data: "This is not to say that the mass citizenry now has
patterns of attitude consistency equal to that of a group of political Elites such as
congressional candidates." Id. 137.
Note that these studies dealt only with the lack of knowledge of voters; the
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Revisionists have therefore presented a vision of democracy in
which more-involved elites compete for the allegiance of the masses
at election time, but in which most individuals have no significant
role beyond exercising a periodic choice through election, or occasionally through other formalized procedures. 62 Such data and
theories may seem to make the instrumental value of classical
democracy a museum piece. If so, it might be argued that the
implications I have drawn from my theory about the broader value
of individual self-realization are inaccurate. This, however, is not
the case.
First, it should be noted that the impact of the elitists' argument goes at most to the instrumental value of democracy, and in
no way challenges the intrinsic value of allowing individuals to
maintain self-rule.6 3 More importantly, the elitist theorists do not
seem to question the normative imperative recognized by classical
theorists, but rather only its attainability. Indeed, the impact of
the elitist theorists is arguably to shift the emphasis from attaining
this goal through the political process to its achievement through
individual involvement in the private sector. Modern theorists
have redefined the concept of the "political" to include decision,
making within areas such as the work place, where decisions are
likely to have a more immediately recognizable impact on the individual's daily life.64 Therefore, the elitist theory can be seen as
implications about the many who do not even perform that minimal civic function

are all too clear. Dahl has suggested an explanation for such behavior:
The explanation, no doubt; lies in the fact that man is not by instinct a
reasonable, reasoning, civic-minded being. Many of our most imperious
desires and the source of many of our most powerful gratifications can be

traced to ancient and persistent biological and physiological drives, needs,
and wants. Organized political life arrived late in man's evolution; today
man learns how to behave as a political participant with the aid, and often

with the hindrance, of instinctive equipment that is the product of a long
development. To avoid pain, discomfort, and hunger, to satisfy drives
for sexual gratification, love, security, and respect are insistent and primordial needs. The means of satisfying them quickly and concretely
generally lie outside political life.
R. Dmm, supra note 60, at 103-04. If Dahl is correct, the problem is not that the
classical theories are outmoded in modem society, but rather that they were unrealistic from their inception. In any case, the problem remains with us.
62
See Keim, supra note 56, at 7 ("[Under revisionist theory, h]omo civicus
is constrained to a mode of participation characterized by the binomic 'yes' or 'no.'
Participation is effectively reduced to the approval or disapproval of the performance
of elected official and lobbyist.").
63 Id.
64

EcLnm's

See P. BACHRACi, supra note 55, at 102-03.
OF CrrzENsmr (1968).

See generally R. PRANGE,

Tim
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being totally compatible with the thesis asserted here; democratic
political control is only one means of achieving the values inherent
in a democratic system, and it is therefore necessary to recognize
that free speech may aid attainment of those values in nonpolitical
settings.
Elitist thinking, then, does not undermine-indeed, it may facilitate-the extension of Meiklejohn's reasoning about the role of
free speech to such nonpolitical activities as various kinds of community groups, as well as to the work place.es What remains
unclear, however, is whether this logic may be extended as well to
such purely private decisions as commercial purchases or an individual's choice of friends. The difficulty is that it has been generally assumed, since democracy's origins in ancient Athens, that
the moral benefits to the individual derived from being forced to
look beyond his or her own narrow interests and to work with others
to attain the common good. 66 It is perhaps for this reason that
Professor Bachrach, the leading exponent of the redefined "political" sphere, believed it necessary to stay within the bounds of
67
the "political," no matter how strained his definition of the term.
But whatever unique benefits one derives from involvement in
organizations that look to the common, as opposed to the individual,
good, it is impossible to deny that many of the developmental
values-particularly the intellectual benefits-that are thought to
result from participation in the political process also may be obtained from private self-government. After all, the elitists tell us
that "[p]olitical participation constitutes an effort to protect
threatened interests," Is and by adopting a democratic system we
are expressing a belief that presumably individuals are capable
of deciding what is best for them. There is therefore no basis to
believe that development can be derived solely from common, as
opposed to individual, activity.
65 See P. BACHRACH, supra note 55, at 96 & n.2; see also Mansbridge, The
Limits of Friendship, in PAITIcPATION n~r Po~rncs: Nomos XVI 246 (J. Pennock

& J. Chapman eds. 1975).

Of course, the constitutional requirement of state or

federal action would limit the first amendments reach into these nonpolitical or

private areas to restricting governmental interference with the exercise of free
speech.
6

6
See G. SABmIE & T. THOnSON, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEoRY 64-66, 539-44
(4th ed. 1973).
67The political scientist must recognize, Bachrach says, "that large areas
within existing so-called private centers of power are political and therefore potentially open to a wide and democratic sharing in decision-making." P. BACRMACH,
supra note 55, at 102; see also Keim, supra note 56, at 13.

68

Keim, supra note 56, at 7.
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A final, related argument is that speech concerning the political process is simply more important than speech concerning
private decisionmaking, because it affects many more lives. One
may question, however, whether this is true of all activity within
the political process; one can imagine town council elections in
miniscule hamlets, which, I assume, both Meiklejohn and Bork
would include in their definition of "political," even though relatively few people would be affected. In any event, the argument
is misleading, because it fails to recognize that, when we value
private decisionmaking, we are referring to such decisionmaking
on the part of all individuals.
II.

AN INQUIRY
ALTERNATIVE GOALS OF FREE SPEECH

SEPARATING VALUE FROM SUBVALUE:

INTO THE

This Article so far has established at most that values inherent
in the democratic process extend the benefit of free speech well
beyond the confines of the "political." The original claim made
in this Article, however, was considerably more ambitious: that all
of the so-called "values" of free speech, to the extent that they
are to be accepted, derive ultimately from the single value of selfrealization. Such a demonstration would preclude future theorists
from asserting that, although they believe in the concept of free
speech, they will select a value other than self-realization as the
guiding force. The argument here is that, to the extent you accept
the value of free speech at all, you must necessarily accept the selfrealization value, for there is no other. In addition, for the thesis
to be complete, it must be established that those who do accept the
self-realization value cannot logically escape acceptance of these
"'subvalues" as well. It is to these issues that we now turn.
A. The Checking Function
Perhaps the asserted value most closely analogous to the "democratic process" value is Professor Blasi's "checking function."
Blasi believes that speech concerning misconduct by government
officials deserves special constitutional protection. 69
69 In Blasi's words, "if one had to identify the single value that was uppermost
in the minds of the persons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment, this
checking value would be the most likely candidate." Blasi, supra note 2, at 527.
Although Blasi at one point asserts that "the checking value is to be viewed as a
possible supplement to, not a substitute for, the values that have been at the center
of twentieth-century thinking about the First Amendment," id. 528, he later asserts
that speech related to the checking function "should . . . be accorded a level of
constitutional protection higher than that given any other type of communication,"
because "the particular evil of official misconduct is of a special order." Id. 558.
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The first question about Blasi's checking function concerns the
precise scope of the speech included within it. At different points,
Blasi refers to speech concerning "abuse of power," the misuse of
official power," and "breaches of trust by public officials," 70 implying that these are the operative terms. But the meaning of these
terms is by no means self-evident. A natural starting point would
seem to be illegal conduct on the part of public officials, such as
taking bribes, and Blasi unquestionably intends to include such
activity.71 But he does not stop there, nor could he without all but
trivializing the free speech guarantee. If we are to understand
where his theory is to apply, we must know exactly what, in addition to illegal conduct, Blasi would include under the heading of
"misconduct." In attempting to define "a viable concept of official
'misconduct' that does not simply collapse into 'unwisdom' or 'unpopularity,' " 72 Blasi provides some illustrations:
Some governmental actions such as the deliberate bombing
of civilians during wartime, the assassination of foreign
political figures, or less extreme examples of improper involvement in the domestic affairs of another nation might
also be regarded as so in violation of shared standards of
morality as to fall within a distinctive concept of
misconduct.7 3
So described, Blasi's first amendment theory degenerates into
little more than a means of fostering one individual's-presumably
Professor Blasi's-political philosophy and foreign policy.74 What
about the individual who believed that not bombing civilians in the
Vietnam War would have been "misconduct"-someone who would
assert that "if we are going to fight a war, let's win it; it's immoral
to have our boys die in a limited war"-or who believes that assassinating certain foreign political figures-perhaps Castro or Hitler or
Idi Amin-is morally dictated? Are only those who share the views
on these issues described by Professor Blasi to receive the special pro70 Id.

527.

See id. 543 ("Behavior in violation of the applicable criminal code such as
embezzlement or the acceptance of a bribe might provide a starting point for such
71

a concept.").
72

Id.

73Id.
74 At the outset of his article, Professor Blasi notes the impact that public outcries had on limiting the Asian war policies of Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Id.
527; see also id. 640 ("[Tlhe communication achieved by the wave of draft-card
bumings at the height of the United States involvement in Vietnam represents a
paradigm example of the 'speech' with which the First Amendment is concerned.").
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tection given speech concerning the checking function? Such a
result-oriented, content-based approach to free speech must of course
be rejected, yet it seems to be the implication of Professor Blasi's
description of "official misconduct," for Professor Blasi's theory by
its terms refers to conduct, rather than issues. Moreover; what
about discussion of official conduct that, although perhaps not offensive to Professor Blasi, is considered by many to be so? Is it
"misconduct" for the government to allow .abortions? To pay
welfare? Again, to deny the inclusion of speech concerning such
official actions would constitute a wholly unacceptable. interpretation of the first amendment on the basis of political or social viewpoint, -for if the first amendment means anything. it is that the
level of constitutional protection cannot vary on the basis of differing viewpoints. 75
Perhaps Professor Blasi did not intend to establish such a
solipsistic view. of the first amendment. At one point, he states
that "[u]nder the checking value, that determination [of what
actions can be considered misconduct] must be made by each citizen in deciding when the actions of government so transcend the
bounds of decency that active opposition becomes a civic duty." 76
But Blasi's distinction of speech concerning official "misconduct"
from speech about general governmental action collapses if the
determination of what is official misconduct is to be left to the
individual citizen. For how effective a limit would it be if any
individual could render governmental action or inaction "misconduct" for first amendment purposes merely by characterizing it as
such?
At least in a broad sense, however, it is accurate to recognize
the value of speech, as Professor Blasi does, as a means of controlling
governmental actions. 77 The question for discussion, then, is
whether this value is independent of the self-realization value or,
instead, as contended here, is merely derivative.
Professor Blasi describes the purposes thought to be served by
the checking function. He argues primarily that "a proponent of
75 I have argued elsewhere that it is improper to provide stricter constitutional
scrutiny to regulation of expression based on content than to regulation that is imposed equally on all speech. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAr. L. 11Ev. 113 (1981). However, this was not intended to'imply
that less scrutiny should be given to viewpoint regulation, but rather that greater
scrutiny should be given to neutral regulation.
76 Blasi, supra note 2, at 543 (footnote omitted).
77
As restructured, Professor Blasi's "checking function" appears strikingly. similar to the "democratic process" value of Meiklejohn, notwithstanding Professor
Blasi's statements to the contrary, see id. 558.
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the checking value views speech of a certain content as important
because of its consequences: alerting the polity to the facts or
implications of official behavior, presumably triggering responses
that will mitigate the ill effects of such behavior." 78 If Blasi is
correct in characterizing the checking function as fostering the
consequential value of producing "good results," the value would
in fact be distinct from the "process" goals inherent in the selfrealization value. But closer examination of the reasoning behind
the checking function reveals that this value can be sustained only
on the basis of process, rather, than consequential values. To view
the checking function as having a consequential value logically
requires us to adopt the following reasoning: if government officials
believe that it is correct to do "A"-a particular course of action
or policy decision-and some or many members of the public believe that doing A would constitute "misconduct" and instead
prefer that the officials do "B," we know that B will produce
"better"-less evil or more beneficial-results than A will. But this
conclusion surely does not follow as a matter of logic, and may well
be counter-intuitive in light of the empirical evidence obtained by
elitist theorists of a tremendous lack of political interest and knowledge on the part of the large mass of private citizens.79
Of course, if we were to read Professor Blasi to suggest that
there is a set category of political actions that are to be objectively
deemed "misconduct," s0 then we would be able to conclude that
speech by private citizens criticizing such activity would produce
"better" results. But, as already noted,"' such an unprincipled
construction of the first amendment, providing greater protection
to speech urging results with which one agrees, is totally unacceptable. Therefore, we must assume, as Blasi states at another
point, that it is the individual citizen's subjective characterization
of official action as "misconduct" that is determinative.8 2 Given
78 Id. 546 (emphasis in original). This emphasis on consequences is what Professor Blasi believes primarily distinguishes the checking function from what he
describes as the "autonomy" value. Id. At another point, underscoring his "consequentialist" approach, he states that the evil of government misconduct "is so
antithetical to the entire political arrangement, is so harmful to individual people,
and also is so likely to occur, that its prevention and containment is a goal that takes
precedence over all other goals of the political system." Id. 558 (footnote omitted).
79 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. According to Professor Walker,
"[a]t the heart of the elitist theory is a clear presumption of the average citizen's
inadequacies." Walker, supra note 51, at 286.
80
See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
81
See supra text accompanying note 75.
8

2 Blasi,

supra note 2, at 543.
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that premise, we cannot support the checking value on consequential grounds, for we cannot be sure that the official policies thought
by particular individuals to constitute "misconduct" necessarily
would be more evil than the alternative policies urged by the private individuals.
To the extent that there is an important value behind the
checking function, then, it must be a process value. And it is not
difficult to determine what that value is; it is the intrinsic democratic value that individuals should have a say in the policies of
their government, because their government, in a democracy, is acting on their behalf. As democratic theorist Edmond Cahn has
stated, democracy requires "examining, judging, and assuming responsibility for what our representatives do in our name and by our
authority, the unjust and evil acts as well as the beneficent and
good." 83 Indeed, to the extent that Professor Blasi relies on the
proposition that "the general populace must be the ultimate judge
of the behavior of public officials," s4 he, too, is viewing the checking function as merely one manifestation of the intrinsic democratic value. 5 Because the checking function ultimately derives
83 E. CAuN, TnE Pnrxmcnx

or DEmocCrATic MAN 29 (1961).

84

Blasi, supra note 2, at 542.
8
5 Blasi acknowledges that "the checking value grows out of democratic theory,
but it is the democratic theory of John Locke and Joseph Schumpeter, not that of
Alexander Meiklejohn." Id. His reference to Schumpeter, however, is puzzling.
Blasi asserts that, under Schumpeter's view, "the role of the ordinary citizen is not
so much to contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of public policy as to
retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain
bounds." Id. (footnote omitted). However, Schumpeter actually raised serious
doubts about the individual citizen's ability to question the specific policies of
See J. ScHUMPETER, CAPrrIAmsm, SOCIAIM AiN DEMOCRACY 261
(3d ed. 1950); see also C. PATEmAN, PARniCiPA-roN MM DEMOCRATIC TI-Moay 3-4

government.

(1970). Schumpeter urged an extremely limited role for private citizens, primarily that of "accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them." J.
Sc~umhrar,
supra, at 285. It is doubtful that this philosophy is consistent with
Professor Blasi's view that private citizens have authority to determine for themselves
what actions of public officials constitute misconduct. Blasi, supra note 2, at 543.
Blasi actually is probably much closer to Meiklejohn than he is to Schumpeter,
for essential to Meiklejohn's philosophy was the belief that "[a] government of free
men can properly be controlled only by itself. Who else could be trusted by us to
hold our political institutions in check?" A. MNIXE~joHN, supra note 8, at 16.
Although Meiklejohn believed that the people were truly the "governors" and that
elected officials were merely their agents, he did not advocate a system of direct
democracy. Rather, he believed that citizens needed information and opinion, so
that they could better perform their governing function in the voting booth.
Meildejohn, supra note 11, at 255-56.
Blasi asserts that "[t]he self-government value [of Meildejohn] appears to place
slightly more emphasis on argumentation (as contrasted with information) than
does the checking value." Blasi, supra note 2, at 563. However, if Blasi believes
that the activities of antiwar protestors (including draft card burning) constitutes
a classic example of how the checking function operates, see id. 554, it is difficult
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from the principle of democratic self-rule, and because that prinLciple in turn follows from the self-realization value,8 6 the checking
function is merely one concrete manifestation of the much broader
self-realization value.8 7
B. The Marketplace-of-Ideas Concept
"[T]he ultimate good desired," wrote Justice Holmes in his
Abrams dissent, "is better reached by free trade in ideas-.

.,.

the

best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market . .

.

. That at any rate is the

theory of our Constitution." 88 The theory, derived originally
from John Stuart Mill,89 posits, in the accurate description of one
of its critics, that:
[C]ompetition among ideas strengthens the truth and roots
out error; the repeated effort to defend one's convictions
serves to keep their justification alive in our minds and
guards against the twin dangers of falsehood and fanaticism; to stifle a voice is to deprive mankind of its message, which, we must acknowledge, might possibly be more
true than our own deeply held convictions.... Just as an
unfettered competition among commodities guarantees that
the good products sell while the bad gather dust on the
shelf, so in the intellectual marketplace the several competing ideas will be tested by us, the consumers, and the
best of them will be purchased.9 0
The "marketplace-of-ideas" concept, in its use as a defense of
free speech, has often been subjected to savage attack,9 1 and to a
to accept his information-opinion distinction. For were not the primary activities
of the antiwar movement more a matter of expressing opinion than of conveying
information?
8
6See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
87Blasi

expends considerable effort in an attempt to establish a historical link

between the checking value and the origins of the first amendment. Blasi, supra
note 2, at 529-38. But most of the historical sources to which he refers were concerned primarily with ensuring the liberty of citizens-the intrinsic democratic
value-and saw the checking of government not as an end in itself or as a means of
assuring "better results," but as a means of assuring that government would not
interfere with the individual's exercise of his liberty.
88
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89 J. MiLL, supra note 51. According to Professor Baker, Mill provides the
"marketplace-of-ideas" theory's "best formulation." Baker, supra note 15, at 968
n.9; see also R. WOLFF, THE Povxarv OF Lmmi.wsm 11-12 (1968).
90 R. WOLFF, supra note 89, at 11-12; see also Baker, supra note 15, at 967.
91 See, e.g., B. WoLFF, supra note 89, at 12-19; Baker, supra note 15, at
974-81. According to Professor Dworkin, "John Stuart Mill's famous essay On
Liberty has on the whole served conservatives better than liberas... . [C]ritics
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certain extent the attacks have been entirely valid. In one sense,
the theory appears to suffer from an internal contradiction: the
theory's goal is the attainment of truth, yet it posits that we can
never really know the truth,9 2 so we must keep looking. But, if we
can never attain the truth, why bother to continue the fruitless
search? More importantly, any theory positing that the value of
free speech is the search for truth creates a great danger that someone will decide that he finally has attained knowledge of the truth.
At that point, that individual (or society) may feel fully justified,
as a matter of both morality and logic, in shutting off expression
of any views that are contrary to this "truth." To be sure, Mill
would not have accepted such reasoning. He believed that even
views that we know to be false deserve protection, because their
expression makes the truth appear even stronger by contrast. 93 But
acceptance of Mill's initial premise that the goal of free speech is
the ultimate attainment of truth does not necessitate acceptance of
this second premise. For, as Dean Wellington has argued, "[i]t is
naive to think that truth will always prevail over falsehood in a
free and open encounter, for too many false ideas have captured
the imagination of man." 94 Therefore, if the only value of free
speech were the attainment of truth, we might persuasively argue
that the view that the Earth is the center of the Universe does not
deserve constitutional protection, because we know the truth to be
different. Perhaps we could further conclude that constitutional
protection should not be given to the assertion that cigarette smoking does not cause cancer, because the Surgeon General has already
discovered the truth about this subject; the same could be said
about the view that certain races are genetically inferior, since we
know that all men are created equal. The danger-one that Mill
would undoubtedly neither expect nor condone-should by now be
dear.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the marketplaceof-ideas concept must be discarded. To the contrary: if viewed as
merely a means by which the ultimate value of self-realization'is
of liberalism have been pleased to cite the essay as the most cogent philosophical
defense of that theory, and then, by noticing the defects in its argument, argue that
T.AEMG RIGHTS SEmOUSLY 259 (1977).
liberalism is flawed." R. DwonEa,
92
See I. BEunw, supra note 54, at 188 ("EMill's] argument is plausible only
on the assumption... that human knowledge was in principle never complete, and
always fallible; that there was no single, universally visible, truth.
).
93 J. MmL, supra note 51, at 34-45.
94 Wellington, supra note 48, at 1130 (emphasis in original).
Bmmuw, supra note 54, at 187.

See also I.
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facilitated, the concept may prove quite valuable in determining
what speech is deserving of constitutional protection. In other
words, it could be argued that, if the intrinsic aspect of the selfrealization value 9r is to be maintained, the individual needs an uninhibited flow of information and opinion to aid him or her in
making life-affecting decisions, in governing his or her own life.
Since the concept of self-realization by its very nature does not
permit external forces to determine what is a wise decision for the
individual to make, it is no more appropriate for external forces
to censor what information or opinion the individual may receive
in reaching those decisions. Thus, an individual presumably has
the right 96 not to associate with people of different races in the
privacy of his home, and may decide to exercise that right because
he believes those who contend other races are genetically inferior.9 7
That is his choice, and he may reach it on whatever basis he
chooses, no matter how irrational it may seem to others. Because
individuals constantly make life-affecting decisions-from the significant to the trivial-each day of their lives, there is probably
no expression of opinion or information that would not potentially
affect some such decision at some point in time. Therefore, the
marketplace-of-ideas concept as a protector of all such expression
makes perfect sense. 98
So revised, the marketplace-of-ideas concept can be successfully
defended against another attack: Baker's contentions that the theory
"requires that people be able to use their rational capacities to
eliminate distortion caused by the form and frequency of message
presentation and to find the core of relevant information or argument," and that "[t]his assumption cannot be accepted [be95 See supra text following note 49.
961n using the term "right" in this context, I do not intend to limit its meaning
to a constitutional, or even a statutory, right, although in certain instances it could
conceivably be either of these. I mean, rather, the absence of a governmental

prohibition.

97
An individual of course would not be allowed to decide on the basis of this
information to kill members of these races, or to refuse to associate with them in

public accommodations. These are situations in which society has decided to limit
the individual's freedom of action.
98 Although I will deal with the point in detail in subsequent discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 110-18, it is perhaps necessary to emphasize here that
I am referring only to the issue of what speech rightfully belongs within the first
amendment's umbrella of constitutional protection. Since I am not a believer in
construing the first amendment to provide absolute protection to speech, the conclusion that speech falls within the first amendment does not necessarily imply that
it will outbalance all competing social concerns.
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cause e]motional or 'irrational' appeals have great impact." 99 If
we accepted the attainment of truth as the theory's goal, Professor
Baker's point would be well taken. But the point becomes irrelevant if we instead view the theory simply as a means of facilitating
the value of self-realization. For if an individual wishes to buy
a car because he believes it will make him look masculine, or to
vote for a candidate because the candidate looks good with his tie
loosened and his jacket slung over his shoulder, who are we to tell
him that these are improper acts? We may prefer that he make his
judgments (at least as to the candidate, if not the car) on more
traditionally "rational" grounds, and hope that appeals made on
such grounds will be heard. But in these areas society has left the
ultimate right to decide to the individual, and this would not be
much of a right if we prescribed how it was to be used. 100
C. The "Liberty" Model
Although Professor Baker's primary attack on the marketplaceof-ideas theory is premised on the inability of the system to produce
rational results, the essential elements of his own theory of free
expression, if accepted, logically lead to a rejection of even the
revised version described here. Professor Baker adopts as the center
of his theory of free speech the "liberty model," 101 under which
respect for individual autonomy leads us to protect communication
99Baker, supra note 15, at 976. According to Baker, "[tihe assumptions on
which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are almost universally rejected
today." Id. 974. However, there may be some inconsistency in Baker's analysis.
On the one hand, he attacks the marketplace-of-ideas concept because it is premised
on a presumption of individual rationality that is unrealistic. Yet Baker's own theory
of free speech is based on the view that individuals must be respected as "equal,
rational and autonomous moral beings." Id. 991 (emphasis added). He rejects
limitations on free speech that are designed "to protect people from harms that
result because the listener adopts certain perceptions or attitudes," because to do
so "disrespects the responsibility and freedom of the listener." Id. 998.
100 It might be argued that the marketplace-of-ideas theory is unrealistic in
assuming that, absent government regulation, individual decisionmakers will receive
an unbiased flow of information because certain groups, holding particular viewpoints, control the media and exclude unpopular opinions from the information
stream. Many who have recognized this difficulty have urged increased right of
access to the communications media. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HAnv. L. Bnv. 1641 (1967). Such an access theory faces serious constitutional
questions itself, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
but, at least under certain circumstances, provides an answer to this criticism. In
any event, even if this criticism were accepted, it does not imply that the marketplace-of-ideas theory is useless, but merely that it is not perfect. Thus, this argument offers no support for any efforts to further impede the flow of information.
101 Baker, supra note 15, at 990.
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that defines, develops, or expresses "the self." 102 "[T]he values.
supported or functions performed by protected speech," he writes,
"result from that speech being a manifestation of individual freedom and choice." 103 Therefore, he concludes, speech that "does
not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a way
which can be expected to represent anyone's private or personal
wishes" is not deserving of constitutional protection. 1°4 It is for
this reason that Baker would give no constitutional protection to
commercial speech.1 0 5 Because there is presumably a considerable
amount of information or opinion flowing to individuals from corporations and others who are motivated by economic considerations,
Baker would not be likely to accept even the revised rationale for
the marketplace-of-ideas theory. Although Baker correctly recognizes the self-realization value lying behind the protection given
free speech, he has so narrowly confined this concept that he has
effectively excluded significant amounts of expression that could
substantially foster the self-realization value.
Baker's adoption of an extremely narrow view of how the selfrealization value can be fostered apparently results from his acceptance of a truncated version of the value itself. The form of
self-realization that he seems to be describing is limited to the
"instrumental" value referred to previously: the value of having
individuals develop their faculties. 106 Even with this truncated
version, Baker has failed to acknowledge that individuals may develop their personal and intellectual faculties by receiving, as well
as by expressing. 10 7 Once this is recognized, we can see that the
Id. 992.
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA
L. REv. 1, 3 (1976) (footnote omitted).
104 Id. Baker elsewhere has argued that "if it is not a manifestation of the
speaker's values, even though the speech may cause change or advance knowledge,
it does not serve this liberty value and is not protected," Baker, supra note 15, at
991 n.86, and that "to the extent that speech is involuntary, is not chosen by the
speaker, the speech act does not involve the self-realization or self-fulfillment of the
speaker," id. 996 (emphasis in original).
105 Baker, supranote 103, at 3.
106 Baker notes that, "[oln the liberty theory, the purpose of the first amendment is not to guarantee adequate information." Baker, supra note 15, at 1007.
He also writes, however, that "[slelf-expressive and creative uses of speech more
fully and uniformly promote the two key first amendment values, self-fulfillment and
participation in both societal decisionmaking and culture building, than does speech
which communicates propositions and attitudes." Id. 995 (emphasis omitted).
107 At one point, Baker acknowledges that "[t]he listener uses speech for selfrealization or change purposes and these uses provide the basis of the listener's
constitutional right." Id. 1007. He adds, however, that "the constitutional analysis
of any restriction must be in terms of who is restricted-the speaker or the listener.
102
103
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motivation of the speaker may be irrelevant, as long as the individual's faculties are developed by the receipt of information
whether it be opinion or fact. For example, that an author is
writing primarily to make money, rather than to express his personality, does not diminish the potential development of the reader.
More important, however, is Baker's refusal to recognize the correlative principle to self-fulfillment's instrumental value: the intrinsic value, self-rule. Thus, if an individual is given the opportunity to control his destiny, at least within certain bounds, he or
she needs all possible information that might aid in making these
life-affecting decisions. Because Baker fails to include this vital
aspect of the self-realization concept, he develops a theory of free
speech that is correspondingly incomplete.
Even if we were to accept Baker's unduly narrow conception
of self-realization, his theory fails to deal adequately with the inseparability of the profit motive from the desire for self-expression.
The problem arises because many people make a living by means
of self-expressive work. Should the creative advertiser or commercial artist not be recognized for their "self-expression," merely because they are doing it to make money? Baker responds that "even
if the speech happens to correspond to the speaker's values, the
content is determined by the structure of the market and is not
chosen by the speaker." 108 But surely within the dictates of the
market structure the advertiser has a range of selection; there is
never merely a single possible way to sell a product. Thus, can
we not say that within that range the advertiser has exercised his
or her self-expression? Moreover, if we accept Baker's analysis,
what protection do we give to the political candidate who tailors
his public positions to what he thinks will lead to his election, to
the magazine or newspaper that chooses to publish what sells, or
to the author who writes what he believes his audience will buy?
Are their efforts not to receive first amendment protection? And
what would Baker say about the level of first amendment protection to be given to welfare or social security recipients who picket
to protest insufficient government aid? Is not their expression also
dictated by the needs of the market?
Both parties have separate constitutional claims. Only if the restricted party does
not have a constitutional claim is the government restriction permissible." Id.
Thus, since Baker. does not believe that those motivated by profit incentives, rather
than self-expression, have a constitutional right, he must believe that these "speakers"
can be constitutionally restricted, even though the listeners' ability to gain fulfillment
may well suffer as a result.
2
108 Id. 966 n.10 .
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Of all of these arguments, Baker attempts a response only to
the question raised about political candidates. His answer is that:
First, for many, if not most, political actors' [sic] political
activity is not primarily and, more importantly, is not
necessarily determined by the need to maximize either
electoral support or economic profit....

Thus, no struc-

ture requires that the speaker choose increased chances of
election (which is not even an option for minor parties)
over increased advocacy of their values. Second, unlike
the economic sphere .

. . ,

many politicians and most de-

fenders of the political process argue that, here, it is highly
praiseworthy to truthfully and forcefully state, explain,
and advocate one's own visions or understanding of the
public good. 10 9
Baker provides no statistical support for his first assertion, and
it certainly seems counter-intuitive to me, at least, to think that
most candidates for office do not have election as their primary
goal. Nor am I convinced of the accuracy of his second assertion,
but even if it were true it is irrelevant. That honesty may be
"praiseworthy" does not mean that many candidates actually practice it, no matter how much they may purport to do so. Most importantly, what would Baker do if he could be convinced that ninetynine percent of candidates were actually motivated more by the
desire for election than by the desire to express their values? Would
he urge no first amendment protection for their speeches? His
logic would seem to lead to that conclusion. Baker's fundamental
assumptions thus appear to be both pragmatically unrealistic and
theoretically dubious.
III.

THE SELF-REALIZATION

VALUE AND THE BALANCING OF

FIRsT AMENDMENT INTERESTS

Professor Blasi writes that:
The concept of human autonomy is largely irreducible.
The libertarian argument from autonomy rests on the

proposition that unless individuals retain a basic minimum
of choice-making capability, they cease to be "individuals"
at all. It is no accident, therefore, that claims based on
the value of individual autonomy tend to be absolute in
nature; they concern not interests to be promoted against
competing regulatory interests but rather constitutive ele109 Id.
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ments the integrity of which must be respected if the
whole edifice of constitutional limitations is to remain
coherent. 110
Professor Baker makes a similar point,"' but it is difficult to understand. The concept of individual autonomy certainly has never
been thought to lead to absolute protection for conduct, yet we may
still maintain a belief in such an autonomy value. Why should
our recognition of something akin to that value as the underlying
force behind the protection of speech necessarily lead to any greater
degree of absoluteness? There is, then, no logically necessary link
between a belief in individual self-realization and a so-called "absolute" construction of the first amendment. In fact, the issue of
absoluteness appears to present the same questions and to give rise
to the same conflicting arguments whatever values are thought to
be fostered by the free speech guarantee.
It is not the purpose of this Article to rehash the competing
contentions on this issue, nor to consider the nuances of the various
absolutist and balancing-test theories that have been suggested over
the years. The primary goal, rather, has been to delimit the scope
of the category of communication and expression that is to fall
within the constitutional protection in the first place. But, in light
of this suggested logical link, it is necessary to provide at least a
brief explanation of why an absolute construction cannot be accepted, even if self-realization is recognized as the ultimate value
underlying the first amendment.
The answer is simply that an absolute construction is (1) not
required by the language of the amendment, (2) not dictated by the
intent of the framers, and (3) impossible in practice. As to the
issue of language, the phrase "freedom of speech" is not necessarily
the same as "speech," and is certainly not self-defining. As to the
intent of the framers, what little evidence there is suggests that, to
the extent they thought about it at all, they intended an extremely
narrow construction of the first amendment,"12 and certainly not an
absolute construction. Finally, I simply refuse to believe that anything in first amendment language or policy requires us to protect
the statement of a mob leader, outside a poorly defended prison,
"10 Blasi, supra note 2, at 547; see also BeVier, supra note 12, at 320.
Ill Baker, supra note 15, at 1009. Note, however, that Baker does not believe
in "absolute" protection for speech (even though he does include certain types of
conduct within the constitutional guarantee), since he excludes speech dictated by
the market structure. See id. 996 &n.102.
112 See L. Lvy, supra note 27, at 247-48.

624

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL 130:591

urging his torch-carrying compatriots to lynch a prisoner inside." 3
Once it is acknowledged that the free speech interest must give
way in such a situation to a competing social interest, acceptance
of at least some form of balancing process is established. The question is simply where to draw the line.
The concept of balancing gained a bad name among civil
libertarians during its heyday in the 1950's, because it was usually
used simply as a code word for substituting legislative determinations for judicial review."14 However, if we define "balancing" to
include definitional balancing, as well as the ad hoc variety, we can
see that the concept has gained wide acceptance," 6 , for any general
rule of first amendment interpretation that chooses not to afford
absolute protection to speech because of competing social concerns is, in reality, a form of balancing. The point, however, is to
balance with "a thumb on the scales" in favor of speech. 1 6 Although the first amendment cannot practically be interpreted to
113 It appears that Professor Baker's construction of the first amendment would
protect such expression. Although Baker believes that "[riespect for individual
autonomy hardly requires protection of speech when the listener is coerced," he also
asserts that "outlawing acts of the speaker in order to protect people from harms
that result because the listener adopts certain perceptions or attitudes disrespects
the responsibility and freedom of the listener." Baker, supra note 15, at 998.
Speech is protected because "it depends for its power on increasing the speaker's
own awareness or on the voluntary acceptance of listeners." Id. 999. Because the
harm in the lynching hypothetical results from "the voluntary acceptance of
listeners," the conclusion seems inescapable that Baker would protect such speech.
114 See, e.g., Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1444 (1962) ("[Ilt must be regarded as very nearly inevitable that a court which
clings to the balancing test will sooner or later adopt a corollary that the balance
struck by Congress is not only presumed correct, but is to be accorded extreme,
almost total, judicial deference."); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAI.,w. L. tEv. 821, 826 (1962) ("Above all,
the open balancing technique is calculated to leave 'the sovereign prerogative of
choice' to the people--with the least interference that is compatible with our
tradition of judicial review."); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
315 It is not my purpose here to debate the relative merits of ad hoc and definitional balancing (also referred to as "categorization"). See generally Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Nimmer, The Right to Speak
From Time to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALw. L. REv. 935 (1968). My point is simply that one need not be an
absolutist if one relies on self-realization as the ultimate value of free speech. What
form of "balancing" one adopts at that stage is beyond this Article's scope. The
only point to be underscored is that, in the broad sense of the term at least, the
categorizers, too, are engaged in "balancing," in that they reject an absolutist approach in favor of an analysis that allows fully protected speech to be superseded by
overriding social interests.
" 6 Frantz acknowledges that "it is conceivable that a court might apply the
balancing test, yet attach so high a value to freedom of speech that the balance
would nearly always be struck in its favor." Frantz, supra note 114, at 1440.
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provide absolute protection, the constitutional language and our
political and social traditions dictate that the first amendment right
must give way only in the presence of a truly compelling governmental interest.1 7 To be sure, such an analysis places a good deal
of faith in the ability of judges to exercise their authority with
wisdom and discretion, both in establishing and applying general
rules of first amendment construction and, where necessary," 8 in
engaging in ad hoc balancing. But, after all, that is what they
are there for, and in any event we appear to have little choice.
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF THE SELF-REALIZATION VALUE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

If the self-realization value were accepted as the guiding force
behind constitutional protection of free speech, it is likely that the
Court's approach to numerous issues of first amendment construction would have to change. The "two-level" concept of speech
derived from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"9 which recognizes a
sublevel of speech that is unworthy of constitutional protection,
would have to be abandoned. That doctrine posits that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
12 0
morality.

The theoretical fallacy in the Chaplinsky doctrine is the assumption that the value of free speech is as a means to attain truth.
Once one recognizes that the primary value of free speech is as a
means of fostering individual development and aiding the making
of life-affecting decisions, the inappropriateness of distinguishing

between the value of different types of speech becomes clear. Al117 I have discussed the application of a "compelling interest" test as a measure
of free speech protection in Redish, supra note 75, at 142-50.
118
See id. 150-51.
19 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see also Beuharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
120 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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though subsequent sections 121 deal explicitly with the categories of
libel and obscenity to which the Court referred in Chaplinsky, the
doctrine's problems can be seen clearly in its application to the
type of speech actually at issue in that case: "fighting words."
In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness distributing literature was
involved in a disturbance and was taken into police custody. On
the way to the police station, he confronted the City Marshall and
allegedly called him "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
Fascist." 122 He was convicted pursuant to a state statute that
made it an offense to address "any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place." 123 Why not view Chaplinsky's comments as a personal catharsis, as a means to vent his frustration at a system he
deemed-whether rightly or wrongly-to be oppressive? Is it not a
mark of individuality to be able to cry out at a society viewed as
crushing the individual? Under this analysis, so-called "fighting
words" represent a significant means of self-realization, whether or
not they can be considered a means of attaining some elusive
"truth."
This is not to suggest that fighting words should receive absolute protection, any more than any other form of expression
deserves such a guarantee of freedom. 124 The point, rather, is that
fighting words should not be deemed constitutionally regulable per
se. If, in particular circumstances, such words are likely to have
the effect of starting a riot or significantly and immediately disturbing the peace, their use can of course be subjected to penalty. But
in Chaplinsky itself no such showing was even attempted, and,
given the facts, it is unlikely that one could have been made. For
the words were not spoken to militant armed opponents of Jehovah's
Witnesses in the street, but to an apparently oversensitive city official on the way to the police station. Other than a slight ruffling
of the official's feathers, Mr. Chaplinsky's colorful language did not
cause any harm. Hence, if the Court had recognized the legitimate
first amendment value in the use of such language, it would have
been required to engage in a careful weighing of competing interests, an endeavor it seemingly found not to be worth the effort.
The discussion of the level of constitutional protection to be
given so-called "fighting words" raises a broader issue: whether
See infra text accompanying notes 158-202.
315 U.S. at 569.
123 Id.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
121
122
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there is any form of pure expression that does not foster self-realization, and that therefore is not worthy of first amendment protection. In answering this question, it is necessary to recall the two
different aspects of self-realization: self-governance and the development of one's human faculties. 125 As to the former, there is clearly
a wide variety of speech that is irrelevant, for this branch of the
self-realization value is furthered only by expression that provides
information or opinion that will aid an individual in making decisions about how his or her life will be conducted. Thus, advocacy
of unlawful conduct cannot be deemed relevant, because the individual is not allowed to undertake the conduct urged by that form
of expression. Nor is the dissemination of undisputedly false factual information a valid means of aiding private self-government,
since such information cannot be thought to provide legitimate
guidance to individual decisionmaking1 26 A mere stream of obscenities must also be deemed irrelevant to the goal of private
self-government.
There is more to self-realization, however, than private selfgovernment. For it is highly doubtful that fine art, ballet, or literature can be thought to aid one in making concrete life-affecting
decisions, yet all three seem deserving of full first amendment protection. This is because of the other branch of self-realization: the
development of one's human faculties, recognized as an end in itself.
Once this form of self-realization is acknowledged, it becomes significantly more difficult to exclude many of the categories of expression deemed irrelevant to the private self-government branch.
Of course, we might conclude that, whereas art, literature,
and ballet are proper means of developing one's mental faculties, a
mere stream of obscenities or advocacy of crime is not. But, although it may well be appropriate to distinguish among different
forms of expression on the ground that some of them present greater
danger of harming society, 127 it is considerably more doubtful that
an arm of the state should have the authority to decide for the
individual that certain means of mental development are better
than others. If two consenting individuals wish to engage in a
conversation consisting of little more than a stream of obscenities,
125

26

See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.

1 There may still be a problem about suppressing certain false factual assertions, because of the potential chilling effect on expression of true factual statements.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127 See supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
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assuming no harm to others, 128 it is dangerous to provide the state
with the power to prohibit such activity on the ground that such
discourse is not "valuable." 129 For, if the state can make that decision, what is logically to prevent it from deciding that the. works
of Henry Miller are not "valuable" because of their constant use of
obscenities? Or why could not the state similarly set up an administrative board to decide that certain works of literature, art,
dance, or music are not as "valuable" as others, and can therefore
be suppressed? Most of us would no doubt find such a process
intuitively repugnant, presumably even if we agreed with the censor
about the lack of quality of a particular book, movie, or performance. We would explain this feeling of repugnance, I suppose, by
reasoning that it is simply not the state's business to decide for
each individual what books, movies, or shows are "valuable"; that
is a decision for the individual to make for himself or herself. But
once we have gone that far, how could we rationally distinguish
the stream of obscenities between consenting adults? There, too, we
would have to reason that perhaps that particular form of discourse
is not our cup of tea, but that this gives the state no more inherent
right to suppress it than it would have to suppress a particular
book or movie we found distasteful. A stream of obscenities may
not develop one's intellectual abilities (though it could conceivably
increase one's vocabulary), but neither does music, art, or dance.
An individual's "mental" processes cannot be limited to the receipt
and digestion of cold, hard theories and facts, for there is also an
emotional element that is uniquely human and that can be "developed" by such "non-rational" forms of communication. Perhaps a libertarian reading this who still feels awkward about bringing the stream of obscenities within the bounds of the first
amendment should simply transform the hypothetical into a Lenny
Bruce- or George Carlin-type comedian,' 30 who at various points
in his act employs a string of obscenities. I would imagine that
a libertarian would be most uncomfortable in totally excluding such
128 Even if a "stream of obscenities" were fully protected by the first amendment, legitimate "time, place, and manner" regulations could be imposed. For
example, it would probably be legitimate to prohibit such a discussion on a public

street comer, unless the people talking could establish somehow that it was essential
that their discussion take place at that location.
-129 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)

(state cannot prohibit display

of "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket, because it is the individual's choice how to convey
his substantive message).
13o Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)

of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue).

(regulation of broadcast

19821]

THE VALUE OF FREE SPEECH

expression from the first amendment. A conversation between
consenting individuals composed exclusively of obscenities raises
no additional problems.
There may, of course, be some forms of expression that
could
be thought to fall beyond the outer fringes of even this relaxed
-realm of faculty development. A "primal scream," at least if not
-used to communicate a need for help, might be thought to be so
lacking in communicative value as to fall outside the range of self-realization in the sense contemplated by the first amendment. But
.such a purely academic question 1 31 need not detain us for long.
For however the question is ultimately answered, both the courts
and the commentators are a long way from the primal scream in
their unduly narrow classification of expression deserving of full
32
first amendment protection.1
Some might deem it the height of absurdity to equate the value
of a stream of obscenities with great literature or eloquent political discourse. But, of course, not all literature or political discourse is of such a high order. There is much political speech that
many of us find nonsensical, stupid, vile, and repulsive, yet we take
it as given that we cannot gradate first amendment protection on
the basis of how vile or stupid a court or legislature finds the particular political expression to be. 1 33 The same holds true for literature, at least outside of the realm of obscenity. Again, the reason
presumably is that we have construed the first amendment to leave
to the individual final say as to how valuable the particular expression is.
This broad discussion has been designed to demonstrate how
constitutional analysis should be generally altered to reflect acceptance of the self-realization value as the guiding philosophy of the
first amendment. The following discussions are designed to indicate the specific alterations needed in three important areas of
first amendment application: commercial speech, obscenity, and
defamation.
131 The issue is largely academic, because it is difficult to conceive of a reason
why the state would have an interest in regulating a primal scream other than in
the form of traditionally accepted time, place, and manner regulations, which could
be employed even if the actual speech were fully protected by the first amendment.
Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding neutral limits on the use
of sound trucks).
32
'
See supra text accompanying notes 1-17.

13 3 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
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A. CommercialSpeech
The impact of the self-realization value on the protection to be
given commercial speech is not difficult to determine. My comment on the issue some eleven years ago is, I believe, equally
applicable today:
When the individual is presented with rational grounds
for preferring one product or brand over another, he is
encouraged to consider the competing information, weigh
it mentally in the light of the goals of personal satisfaction
he has set for himself, counter-balance his conclusions with
possible price differentials, and in so doing exercise his
abilities to reason and think; this aids him towards the
134
intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment.
To this should be added that information and opinion about competing commercial products and services undoubtedly aid the individual in making countless life-affecting decisions, and therefore
can be seen as fostering both elements of the self-realization value.135
Although the Supreme Court for many years casually dismissed even the most minimal level of constitutional protection for
commercial speech, 136 in 1976 the Court finally recognized this
form of expression as falling within the constitutional guarantee,
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.137 The Court's analysis in reaching this conclusion,
however, contained the seeds of its own destruction. It is therefore
not surprising that six years later commercial speech is perhaps
only marginally better off than it was in the years prior to Virginia
Board.138
13 4 Redish, supra note 34, at 443-44.
135 In my earlier writing, I argued that commercial advertising that conveys
significant factual information that will be of real service to the consumer should
perhaps receive greater constitutional protection than its more "persuasional"
counterpart. Id. 447. Under the analysis developed in this Article, however, such
a distinction is unacceptable. Recognition of the individual's unencumbered right
to make life-affecting decisions logically precludes the determination by external
forces that certain grounds upon which to make such decisions are better than or
preferable to others.
136 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
For a discussion of the early history of the commercial speech doctrine, see Rotunda, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. Ir. L.F. 1080; see
also Redish, supra note 34, at 448-58.
'37 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
133 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Occasionally, however, the Court does still provide
a significant degree of constitutional protection to commercial speech. See Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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In Virginia Board, the Court advanced two grounds for providing constitutional protection to commercial speech, neither of
which represented recognition of a true first amendment value in
that form of expression. The first was more a concrete economic
consideration than a first amendment value. The case concerned a
prohibition on advertising of prescription drug prices, and the
Court noted that "[t]hose whom the suppression of prescription
drug price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and
particularly the aged." 139 Information as to drug prices "could
mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic
necessities." 140 Because of its focus on the immediate material
benefits that flow from commercial advertising and on how governmental regulation impedes such benefits, the Court's analysis
seems closer to the logic of the economic due process cases than it
does to traditional first amendment doctrine.14 '
The second ground recognized by the Court was an indirect
benefit of commercial speech: "Even an individual advertisement,
though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest." 142
The pharmacist affected by Virginia Board, for example, "could
cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in drug
prices, giving his own and those of a competitor as proof." 143
Advertising might well be "indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated." 144
The primary first amendment value of commercial speech, in other
139 425 U.S. at 763.
140 Id.764. The Court stated also that:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve
a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed.

Id. 765.
141 See Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The
New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cu.L. PEv. 205, 216 n.75 (1976) ("The
Court's ruling that the microeconomic functions performed by commercial speech
constitute interests protected by the first amendment is a novel addition to the
list of interests traditionally thought to have first amendment protection ...
[T]he Court's recognition of resource allocation as a constitutionally protected interest, at least when 'speech' is involved, portends a partial return to Lockner's [sic]
substantive due process review of business regulation.").
142 425 U.S. at 764.
143

Id. 764-65.

144

Id. 765.
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words, is that it will lead individuals to think about not merely
what purchasing decisions are personally best for them, but also
about what level of political regulation of the economic system
would be appropriate. The Court appeared unwilling to acknowledge that commercial speech might benefit individuals in the exact
same ways that political speech does: by developing their individual
faculties and aiding them in making life-affecting decisions.
Because it selected indirect and diluted first amendment values
to rationalize protection of commercial speech in Virginia Board,
the Court was conveniently able in subsequent decisions to afford
"commercial speech a limited measure of protection; commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." 145 Thus,
the Court has felt free to allow regulation of commercial speech
when it is shown merely that damage "may" occur, 146 or that harm
is "likely," 147 or that there is a "possibility" of harm.148 These
standards are clearly unacceptable in virtually any other area of
first amendment application. Recognition that protection of commercial and political speech derives from the same ultimate valueas well as that they are equally capable of causing serious harmwould have led the Court to provide them with a comparable level
of constitutional protection.
The difficulty that gave the Court the greatest trouble in providing even the slightest degree of protection to commercial speech
was the regulation of false and misleading advertising. The Court
in Virginia Board suggested two bases on which to distinguish
commercial speech from other forms of expression in order to validate such regulation: that "[t]he truth of commercial speech . . .
may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than . . . news

reporting or political commentary," 149 and that, "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation." 150 To these reasons, Justice Stewart, concurring, added that commercial advertisers
do not suffer from the burdens on "the press, which must often
145 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
Id. 457.
147 Id. 464.
148 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). See also the diluted standard
of protection outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
149 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
150 Id.
146
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attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication deadlines."' '
To the extent that these assertions are accurate, they may
properly influence first amendment analysis under the theoretical
,constructs established in this Article. For they are distinctions
premised not on difference in the relative values of different categories of expression, but rather on regulation's differing effects on
these types of expression. There are serious reasons, though, for
doubting the accuracy of the Court's suggested distinctions.
First, it is questionable whether, in general, the truth of commercial claims is more easily verifiable than the truth of political
assertions. The Court's contention that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea" 152 is correct if one is
comparing statements of political ideology with commercial assertions. But many statements made in the course of political debateparticularly by the press-are simply assertions of fact, which are
presumably verifiable. Moreover, it must be recalled that many
claims about commercial products are, in reality, assertions of
scientific fact, since many commercial products are chemical compounds that may or may not perform the functions or have the
effects claimed for them by scientists If a consumer organization
is constitutionally protected in asserting that a certain product does
not do what is claimed, why should the product's manufacturer not
be similarly protected in contending that it does? 1i3
Second, it is also incorrect to distinguish commercial from
political expression on the ground that the former is somehow
hardier because of the inherent profit motive. It could just as
easily be said that we need not fear that commercial magazines
and newspapers will cease publication for fear of governmental
regulation, because they are in business for profit. Of course, the
proper response to this contention is that our concern is not whether
they will publish, but what they will publish: fear of regulation
might deter them from dealing with controversial subjects. But
could not the same be said of the commercial advertiser? The
possibility of regulation would not deter him entirely from advertising, but it might deter him from making certain controversial
claims for his product.
151

152

Id. 777 (Stewart, J., concurring)..
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).

153 One possible distinction is the speaker's motivation, as in Professor Baker's
theory; however, as noted previously, this argument does not hold up under proper
analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
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Finally, the argument concerning deadline pressure is similarly
not accurate in all cases. For stories of long-range interest or for
some infrequently published journals, the deadline pressure is not
great. For some advertisers who are attempting to defeat a competitor or to gain first entry into a new market, timing may be
critical. Time pressure is relevant to deciding the reasonableness
of an assertion that later proves to have been inaccurate, whether
made by by an advertiser or by the press. It appears irrelevant,
however, to a general attempt to distinguish the two.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that false or misleading advertising must go unregulated. Even in the area of commentary on the conduct of public officials, which is considered by
many to be of central importance to first amendment values,2 4
the Supreme Court has recognized that consciously false assertions
may constitutionally be punished as libelous. 155 It would not undermine recognition of the full first amendment value of commercial
speech, then, to allow regulation of consciously false or misleading
assertions about commercial products or services. Of course, under
this analysis, the infliction of a penalty could only be justified by
a showing that such assertions were consciously false, but it is unlikely that this requirement would preclude the bulk of existing
regulation. If the regulation were limited to a cessation of the
advertising, rather than imposition of a penalty for past conduct,
it is possible that the danger of a chilling effect would be sufficiently reduced to justify regulation even absent a showing of
knowledge or intent.
It is even conceivable that differences would remain under this
approach in the levels of constitutional protection given commercial and political speech. We might reject automatically the existence of a governmental board to review each political speech or
newspaper article and to censor those found to be misleading. But,
again, the difference appears to derive not from a difference in
the relative values of the forms of expression, but from the relative
dangers of regulation. We presumably find such regulation in the
political process so abhorent not because we wish to condone misleading political claims, but rather because of the dangers inherent
in allowing the government to regulate on the basis of the misleading nature of assertions made in the political process. The
154 See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment,' 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191; see also supra text accompanying
notes 28-48.

155 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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fear is that those in power will use such authority as a weapon with
which to intimidate or defeat the political opposition, a result that
has been all too common in our political history. For, in the words
of the noted social commentator Bret Maverick, "the dealer always
cheats." 156 In contrast, there is no reason to believe that much
regulation of misleading advertising is similarly motivated.
Even though this analysis may justify many forms of governmental regulation of false and misleading advertising, it does not
support attempts to draw additional distinctions between commercial and other forms of expression. 15 7 Although regulation and free
expression must be carefully balanced, if balancing leads to different
levels of regulation for different forms of speech, it cannot be because some forms are deemed to be more valuable than others.
B. Obscenity
In light of the significant amount of existing scholarship on
the subject, 58 it is neither necessary nor advisable to engage in an
extended commentary on the various doctrines of obscenity regulation that have pervaded Supreme Court opinions over the last
twenty-five years. 59 Instead, this critique will examine the ration156 J.

ROcHE, supra note 54, at 130.

Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) with In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
Of course, it might be argued that the suspect nature of any regulation of
political expression justifies providing greater protection to all political speech. But
the suspect nature of the regulation of political speech is most acute when imposed
during the course of a political campaign and on such vague grounds as the misleading nature of the expression. More importantly, whereas the presence of an
improper legislative motive for a regulation of speech will justify a finding of
unconstitutionality, it in no way follows that legislative or administrative good
faith automatically justifies regulation of speech. See generally Redish, supra
note 75.
158 See, e.g., J. NowAx, B. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); F. SCHAUm, Tim LAw OF OBscEzrY= (1976); Daniels, The
Supreme Court and Obscenity: An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional PolicyMaking, 17 SAN DEGo L. RIv. 757 (1980); Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity
Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 185 (1969); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLum. L. Bnv. 391 (1963); Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Katz, Privacy and
Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. Or. REv. 203; Lockhart & McClure,
Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MnI. L. REv. 295
(1954); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974); Schauer, Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 605 (1979).
3.9 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (holding zoning
ordinances regulating locations of adult movie theatries permissible); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding expert testimony on obscenity of
films unnecessary when films available as evidence, and that states have legitimate
interest in regulating use of obscene material in local commerce); Miller v. Cali157
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ales offered for the Court's total exclusion of obscenity from the
first amendment in the light of the theoretical analysis of free
speech adopted in this Article. For whatever difficulties the Court
may face in defining obscenity, it continues to exclude obscenity
from any constitutional protection.
The Court's initial exposition of the rationale for excluding
obscenity from first amendment protection came in Roth v. United
States,160 where Justice Brennan in part relied, unconvincingly, 16'
on historical considerations. More significant was his statement
that "[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people ....
But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance." 162 Justice Brennan
then made reference to Chaplinsky's "two-level" theory of free
speech. 63 Thus, the Court, employing a variation of the "search
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (enumerating basic guidelines for triers of fact in
obscenity cases); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (holding statute
prohibiting distribution of obscene materials through the mail-even to willing
adult recipients-constitutional because commerce in obscene material is unprotected
by any constitutional doctrine of privacy); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37)
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (holding statute prohibiting importation of
obscene material constitutional on same grounds as in Reidel); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding individual has right to possess pornographic films
in privacy of home); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (defining obscene material);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding obscenity not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press).
160 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

161 Justice Brennan's historical evidence was that "[tihirteen of the 14 States
[which had ratified the Constitution by 1792] provided for the prosecution of libel,
and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes.
As early as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish any filthy, obscene, or
profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon in imitation or mimicking of religious
services." Id. 482-83 (citations omitted). This is hardly strong support for a
historical obscenity doctrine. As Professor Richards has written:
Colonial legislatures in America appear to have been either unprovoked
by or indifferent to obscenity. Justice Brennan cited only one example of
preconstitutional obscenity law: an early Massachusetts law forbidding
obscene or profane mockery of religious services. This law, however, is
more properly viewed as a religious establishment law than as a law
against obscene literature or art in general ....
Richards, supra note 158, at 75 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, Justice Brennan's
historical reference to the Massachusetts law may prove too much, since there can
be little doubt that today such a law would be declared unconstitutional, regardless
of its historical status. Why, then, should obscenity's possible historical foundation
preclude it from receiving better modem treatment?
162 354 U.S. at 484.
163 Id. 485.
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for truth" analysis, concluded that on this subject at least, it had
discovered the "truth" and knew that obscenity was not related to
it.
Even under a "search for truth" analysis, the Court's conclusion in Roth is subject to criticism, for regulation of obscenity can
be seen as a means of rejecting whatever life style such expression

may implicitly urge. 64 But the Court's greater fallacy is to believe that the primary-or even secondary-purpose of the free
speech guarantee is as a means of attaining truth. If the centrality
of the self-realization value were recognized, the Court would necessarily acknowledge that it is not for external forces-Congress, state
legislatures, or the Court itself-to determine what communications
or forms of expression are of value to the individual; how the individual is to develop his faculties is a choice for the individual
to make.
In more recent decisions, the Court has attempted to either
expand upon or revise its rationale for excluding obscenity from
the constitutional guarantees. In ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton, 65
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, reasoned:
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete
education requires the reading of certain books, . . . and
the well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and
art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character, can we then say that a
state legislature may not act on the corollary assumption
that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a
corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior?

-166

Burger's logic fails. That we assume that good books are good
for people does not necessitate our believing that bad books are
bad for people.167 Burger's erroneous reasoning may perhaps be
.164See Richards, supra note 158, at 78-79.
10 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
63 (citations omitted).
166 Id.
167 The latter assertion is the inverse of the former. As a matter of pure logic,
the inverse of a statement does not necessarily flow from acceptance of the statement
itself, as Burger would have us believe. The only statement that does flow logically
from acceptance of the statement itself is the contrapositive, the converse of the
inverse. Thus, if we were to accept the primary statement, "if people read good
books, they will become better people," the only other statement that is necessarily
proven is that "if people have not become better people, they have not read good
books." This has absolutely no relevance to the possible effect of so-called "bad"

books.
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forgiven, since he was apparently suffering from thinly-veiled irritation at those literati who readily assume-without any real empirical support-the practical value of good literature, yet denounce
those who would restrict obscenity as harmful without any statistical
foundation for their assertions. The Chief Justice failed to understand, however, that the former assertion does not need empirical
support because no issue of constitutional interpretation turns on
it. The same, of course, cannot be said of the latter. More importantly, the Chief Justice assumed that he, a state legislature, a
city council, or a censor board is somehow morally entitled to determine for other individuals which movies and literary works are
and are not "debasing."
Many of the arguments employed to justify regulation of obscenity are not confined to the worthlessness of the expression.
Rather, it is contended that such speech, in addition to being
worthless, is harmful in that it may lead to increases in the levels
of sex-related crimes. 168 Under the first amendment analysis suggested here, regulation of speech may be justified, in rare cases, on
a showing of harm to competing social interests. 169 But this argument cannot of its own weight justify an exclusion of obscenity
from the scope of the first amendment. Initially, the harmful effect
alleged is so speculative that in no area of protected speech would
such a showing justify regulation. 1 0 If such a showing were sufficient, government could constitutionally regulate nonobscene
movies or books that contained detailed depictions or even the
slightest approval of violent acts, since these might result in some
harm.171 But this is clearly not the case, 7 2 so some other distinction must be thought to exist between obscenity and other
forms of expression. This brings the analysis back full circle, to
the contention that obscenity is inherently worthless. The argu168

The Chief Justice's opinion in Paris Theatre, for example, noted that "[tihe

Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and
crime." 413 U.S. at 58.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
170See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Even under the
heavily criticized version of the "clear and present danger" test of Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951), the Court required a substantially greater showing
before allowing regulation of speech advocating violence.
171 In fact, much pornography may in no way directly encourage crime, as
violent movies might be thought to, since it can consist of relations between fully
consenting adults. See Yaff6, The Law Relating to Pornography: A Psychological
Overview, 20 MED., ScL. & L. 20 (1980); see also Cochrane, Sex Crimes and
Pornography Revisited, 6 INTL J. CRMUNOLOGY & PENOLOGY 307 (1978).
72
1 See supranote 170.
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ment for excluding obscenity from the first amendment's scope
therefore necessarily relies on its assumed lack of social value.
The final method that the Court has employed to justify the
exclusion of obscenity is simply to resort to rhetorical devices.
"[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political
debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material," wrote
Chief Justice Burger in Miller v. California,173 "demeans the grand
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom." 174 In Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, added that
"few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited
in the theaters of our choice," 175 and that "society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." 176 By contrasting pornography in a demeaning or negative
way with exalted political speech, the Court precludes, rather than
contributes to debate. But, if we are to deal in such rhetorical
terms, I suppose that the appropriate response to Justice Stevens is
that we are willing to send our sons and daughters off to war, presumably to protect the right of each individual to decide what books
he or she will read and what movies he or she will see, free from
the state's power to determine that such forms of communication
are "worthless." For such freedom is an important element of the
freedoms of self-rule and self-fulfillment, the very same principles
'73

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

74 Id. 34.
175 427 U.S. 50,70 (1976).
176 Id. 70. Justice Stevens was not even referring to material that was legally
defined as obscene. It was, rather, in a sort of constitutional twilight zone: not
extreme enough to meet constitutional standards of obscenity, but nevertheless predominantly erotic in tone. Id.
The actual holding in Young may well have been correct. The Court held that
zoning ordinances regulating the location of adult theatres were permissible:
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the
place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination
of whether a particular film fits that characterization turns on the nature
of its content, we conclude that the city's interest in the present and future
character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of
motion pictures.
Id. 71-72 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court added: "The situation would
be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech." Id. 71 n.35. In a decision last Term, the Court, in invalidating a local ordinance that excluded similar expression, distinguished Young
on just such grounds. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71
n.10 (1981).
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of autonomy from which ultimately derives the freedom to choose
our political leaders.
C. Defamation
Professor Meiklejohn reportedly declared that the decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 177 was an occasion for dancing
in the streets. 7 8 Such a reaction on his part is not difficult to
understand. In New York Times, the Court held that a state could
impose penalties for libel of public officials only upon a showing of
"'actual malice," defined to include knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. 79 Although the Court declined to provide
the absolute protection urged by Meiklejohn, and made no direct
reference to his writings, his influence was clear. 8 0 Indeed, that
the Court limited its holding to protection of libels against public
officials about their official conduct underscores the "political
speech" influence of Meiklejohn. For if the voters are the true
"governors," they need an uninhibited flow of information and
opinions about the conduct of their "agents." As the Court stated
in Garrison v. Louisiannal l (another public official libel case)
shortly after its decision in New York Times, "speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment." 182
In subsequent years, the Court came to face many of the
logical difficulties encountered by Meiklejohn himself. 8 3 In particular, the Court was not able to limit the special protection of the
New York Times doctrine to public officials, since numerous technically private individuals might well have a significant impact
upon the course of political decisionmaking. Therefore, the doctrine was extended to apply also to "public figures." '84 In the
U.S. 254 (1964).
17 8 Kalven, supra note 154, at 221 n.125.
177376

179 376 U.S. at 280.
Justice Brennan, author of the Court's opinion in New York Times, is also
the author of an article discussing Meildejohn's philosophy of free speech. Brennan,
180

The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79
HAmv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
i81 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
182 Id. 74-75.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
184 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Justice Harlan and
three other Justices would have adopted a more easily met standard of liability in
defamation cases involving public figures; under this standard, public figures could
recover damages upon "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an
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closely related area of privacy ,"false light' cases; 85 the Court applied logic similar to that of New York Times to suits both by a
family that had been held hostage by escaped 'convicts and later
made the subject of a fictionalized play, 86 and by a star baseball
pitcher* who was the subject of an unauthorized, fictionalized
87
biography.
One may question whether the apparent underlyifg premise
of New York Times-that speech about the conduct 6f public officials is "the essence of self-government"-justifies the Court's extension of the doctrine to cases involving fictionalized stories about a
family -held captive or about 'baseball players. Apparently recognizing the logical difficulty of this extension, 'Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill emphasized that:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public
affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. 155. However, Chief Justice Warren,
joined by Justices Brennan and White, favored the New York Times standard, and
Justices Black and Douglas argued for absolute protection, as they had done in
New York Times. Thus, a majority of the Court desired to impose at least as
stringent a protection as that imposed in New York Times. See Kalven,-The Rea-sonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. Cr.
REv. 267.'
As was the case with my discussion of obscenity, see supra notes 158-77 and
accompanying text, this analysis of defamation is not intended to supply a detailed
description of the relevant case law. The goal, rather, is to analyze the state of
the law in terms of the theory of free speech described earlier. For a description
of the case development, see J. NowAx, B. RoTuNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note 158,
at 781-89.
18 5 According to Dean Prosser, the tort of invasion of privacy breaks down
analytically into four categories: intrusion, revelation of private facts, commercial
use of one's name or face, and holding someone up to the public eye in a "false
light." W. PRossER, HANBOOK OF THE LAw OF TonTs § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
It is conceptually difficult to understand why the "false light" cases are part of the
privacy tort. It appears that the doctrine actually arose indirectly. Under New'
York's statutory right against commercialization of name or face, the courts accepted
as a defense (used primarily by newspapers and magazines), thatthe use was in
the public interest. An exception to that defense then developed for fictionalized
or false description. See, e.g., Time, Inc.' v. Hill, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604,
260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Julian Messnet, Inc. v. Spahn,
18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239
(1967)., From this background, Dean Prosser apparently" conceived a separate
category of the invasion-of-privacy tort.
186 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
18 7 Julian Messner, Inc. *v. Spahn, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (per curiam). The
Court vacated and remanded the New York Court of Appeals judgment in Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), in
light of the Time decision. The state court had granted damages for the unauthorized publication of a fictitious biography of a baseball player.
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need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes
persons to public view, both private citizens and public
officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The
risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a
society which places a primary value on freedom of speech
and of press ....

We have no doubt that the subject of

the Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an
actual incident, is a matter of public interest. 188
Justice Brennan's statement fails to explain either why our
society "places a primary value on freedom of speech," or what
limits, if any, remain on the extension of the New York Times
logic. Having begun in New York Times by justifying the potential imposition of significant harm to individuals on eloquently
described precepts derived from the concept of self-government, the
Court in Time retreated to some vague notion of "public interest."
And in doing so, the Court neglected to explain whether the "public interest" concept was a descriptive or normative principle. If
the latter, it remains unclear what that normative principle is,
what there is about particular stories such that the public will
benefit from reading them. If the former, it remains unclear why
the first amendment should be construed to allow the imposition
of harm on an individual merely to satisfy the public's idle curiosity.
What began as an attempt at a coherent theory of the value of free
speech thus rapidly dissipated into a collection of vague and unsupported assertions.
The absence of any coherent underlying first amendment
theory was even more evident in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.',9 In
Gertz, the Court rejected the "public interest" concept 191 on two
grounds: that it "would abridge [a] legitimate state interest "I"to
a degree that we find unacceptable"; 192 and that "it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges
188 385 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted).

189 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
190

In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), Justice Brennan's

plurality opinion had adopted a "public interest" test as the guiding principle for
determining application of the New York Times principle in defamation cases.
191 This "legitimate state interest" reference is to the Court's conclusion "that
the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy
for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual." Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345-46.
192 Id. 346.
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to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
'general or public interest' and which do not." 193 The Gertz majority instead applied the "actual malice" standard of liability
only to suits by "public figures." The Court left to the states the
task of defining the standard of liability for suits concerning
"private" individuals involved in an issue of "public interest,"
but with the caveat that they "not impose liability without fault." 194
Two factors that were to influence the determination whether a
defamation plaintiff is a "public figure" were "evidence of general
fame or notoriety" and the extent to which the plaintiff had voluntarily thrust himself into the public eye. 9 5 The Court's emphasis
on public officials' access to opportunities for effective rebuttal 196
indicates the importance of this tactor in defining "public figure."
Although the Court thus has curtailed significantly the level of
constitutional protection given to defamatory statements, it has also
substantially expanded that protection in other respects. The
Court held in Gertz that a state could not constitutionally impose
a standard of absolute liability 97 or allow damages to be presumed898 in defamation cases, even though both were well established practices at common law. 199 The Court was necessarily imposing these limitations under the first amendment; no other constitutional provision was mentioned, and certainly the Court has no
authority to invalidate state common law or statutory practice
without a finding of unconstitutionality. Yet the Court failed to
point to any theory of free speech that justified imposing constitutional limitations on wholly private defamation.2 00
. The Court was- left, then, with a seemingly unprincipled
crazy quilt of first amendment theory as it applied to defamation.
On the one hand, the guiding principle of "public interest" was
rejected, and the Court's emphasis on "voluntary" entry into the
public eye was wholly irrelevant to the Meiklejohnian reasoning
193 Id.

194 Id. 347.

195 !d.351-52.
196 Id. 344.
19'7d. 347. See upra text accompanying note 194.
198Id. 349. The Court qualified this latter prohibition, however, by adding:
"at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth." Id.
199 See W. PRossER, supra note 185, § 113.
200
Although a totally absolute interpretation of the first amendment would lead
to this conclusion, the earlier portion of the Court's opinion made clear that it was
not adopting such an interpretation. See 418 U.S. at 339-40.
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from which the Court had implicitly begun in New York Times.
For, if the operative norm of the first amendment for Meiklejohn
was the need for voters to receive information related to the political process, it would make no difference that that information
concerned someone who had not voluntarily thrust himself into
the public eye. The Court seemed to rely upon a tort concept
rather than a theory of free speech. On the other hand, the Court
was willing to use the first amendment as a means of limiting state
choices in adjudicating private defamation suits.
Although it is almost certain that no member of the Court
consciously applied the concept, it is quite possible to employ the
self-realization principle developed here to rationalize many of the
Court's conclusions in Gertz. First, under this rationale of the
first amendment, it is not necessary to find a broad "public interest" in speech prior to providing it with significant constitutional protection: any speech that may aid in the making of private
self-governance decisions is deserving of first amendment protection.
Comments about a private individual may be relevant to numerous
life-affecting decisions of others, such as whether they should deal
with him socially, enter into a business arrangement with him,
or buy in his store. And imposition of either a strict liability
standard or presumed damages might well deter many defamatory
comments. Thus, the self-realization principle allows us to fashion
an arguable rationale for providing at least a certain level of first
amendment protection even to wholly private defamations.
The self-realization principle cannot be employed so easily
as a rationale for the remaining distinctions among public and
private defamations drawn by the Court in Gertz. For it should
be recalled that, although the Court gave a certain degree of constitutional protection to defamation about entirely private individuals,
it retained use of New York Times' "actual malice" standard only
for defamation of public officials and public figures. But, as noted
previously,20 1 recognition of the self-realization value does not preclude balancing the interest of free speech against competing social
values. Under a balancing concept, we could accept on a theoretical level the equal value of different types of speech, yet still decide that the different areas of expression may be treated differently
because of external considerations. Hence, the Court could arguably conclude that the social harm of defamation of an individual
who has voluntarily entered the public arena is more tolerable than
201 See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
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similar harm infficted upon one who has assumed no risk, even
though all types of defamation-at least in the absence of "actual
malice"-may be thought to foster the self-realization value. Application of the theory developed here, combined with a form of
categorical balancing,20 2 thus could well lead to the complex
structure of constitutional protection for defamatory statements
adopted-albeit without much supporting explanation-in Gertz.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has presented both a critique of preexisting first
amendment theory and a new approach to the issue. Although
each of the existing theories is correct as far as it goes, none sufficiently extends the scope of the constitutional protection. None
of these theories recognizes that the values they advocate are manifestations of the broader principle of individual self-realization.
Once this conclusion is reached, the values recognized in specific
categories of expression will be seen to be no greater than the
benefits of other forms of expression that in turn foster individual
self-realization.
2 2

0 Although the Gertz Court was undoubtedly engaged in a "balancing" process,
in that it declined to give speech absolute protection, it was a form of categorical,
rather than ad hoc, balancing.

